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The language of property underlies the way we talk 
about the relationship between people and things in both 
common law and civil law systems. Property, along with 
contract and tort, is one of the fundamental divisions of 
private law in the common law. Because property is so 
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fundamental to the way lawyers think, we tend to treat 
property as if it is a natural way to view the world. But the 
language of property has a history. The earliest common 
law writs, all of which had something to do with rights in 
land, make no mention of property.1 The earliest surviving 
sources that associate the early common law writs of right, 
novel disseisin, mort d’ancestor, utrum, and darrein 
presentment with a law of property date to the late 1180s, 
twenty to forty years after the writs were first developed.2 It 
is, therefore, anachronistic to refer to these writs as the 
English law of property, but it is also difficult to avoid.  
The language of property actually comes out of a very 
specific cultural and historical context. It comes from 
Roman law and canon law, which together formed the 
medieval ius commune, or common law of Christendom.3 It 
was the ius commune, the ancestor of the civil law systems 
that dominate continental Europe today, that gave English 
its words possession and property.  
In this Article, I will look at two legal treatises that 
span the period between 1187 and 1258. Both were likely 
written by people who worked in the English royal courts. 
The first of these two treatises, De Legibus et 
Consuetudinibus Regni Angliae, known today as Glanvill, 
was written about a generation after Henry II’s famous 
reforms and shows some signs of Roman law influence.4 The 
focus of the article will be on the later of the two treatises. 
In the 1220s, a justice or clerk in the royal courts began 
work on a new treatise and seems to have given it a title 
almost identical to that of Glanvill. It is called De Legibus et 
Consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of 
England) or De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Anglicanis (On 
  
 1. David Seipp has observed that English lawyers got along until about 1490 
without any single concept that had the scope of the word “property.” David J. 
Seipp, The Concept of Property in the Early Common Law, 12 LAW & HIST. REV. 
29, 31 (1994). 
 2. See discussion infra Parts I.B, II. 
 3. R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW 20 (1996) (“The ius 
commune . . . stood above the rules of the different courts, the particular lands, 
and even the individual legislative bodies among which European jurisdictions 
were divided.”). 
 4. G.D.G. Hall, Introduction to THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF 
THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL, at xxxvi-xl (G.D.G. Hall 
ed. & trans., Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002) (1965) [hereinafter GLANVILL]. 
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English Laws and Customs) in most manuscripts.5 Much of 
the treatise had been written by 1236, although it went 
through at least one, and probably two, rounds of writing 
and revision between 1236 and 1258.6 The hands of several 
royal justices touched this treatise. Martin of Pattishall, 
who was the senior justice of the common bench (later the 
Court of Common Pleas) from 1217 to 1229, may have been 
involved in the earliest stages.7 William of Ralegh, 
Pattishall’s clerk and the future chief justice of the court 
coram rege (the court “before the king,” which would later 
be known as the King’s Bench), almost certainly wrote the 
bulk of the treatise.8 Henry of Bratton, Ralegh’s clerk, added 
some material in the 1250s, and may have been working on 
it much earlier.9 It is from a misspelling of Bratton’s name 
that we get the treatise’s common title, Bracton.10 
I will show that it was the authors of Bracton who first 
tried to work the practices of the royal courts and the norms 
of the Anglo-Norman landed elite into a law of property on 
  
 5. BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (Samuel E. Thorne 
trans. 1968–1977) [hereinafter BRACTON]. 
 6. See Thomas Joseph McSweeney, Priests of Justice: Creating Law out of 
Administration in Thirteenth-Century England 114-17 (2011) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with Cornell University Library). 
 7. RALPH V. TURNER, THE ENGLISH JUDICIARY IN THE AGE OF GLANVILL AND 
BRACTON, C. 1176–1239, at 194 (1985). 
 8. Paul Brand, The Age of Bracton, in THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: 
CENTENARY ESSAYS ON “POLLOCK AND MAITLAND” 78 (John Hudson ed., 1996) 
[hereinafter Brand, The Age of Bracton]; Samuel E. Thorne, Translator’s 
Introduction, in 3 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND xxxvi (1977). 
For a contrary view, that the treatise was written in the 1250s and Henry de 
Bratton was the primary author, see J.L. Barton, The Mystery of Bracton, 14 J. 
LEGAL HIST. 1, 8-9 (1993); J.L. Barton, The Authorship of Bracton: Again, 30 J. 
OF LEGAL HIST. 117, 117-19, 150-51 (2009). For Brand’s response to Barton, see 
Paul Brand, The Date and Authorship of Bracton: A Response, 31 J. LEGAL HIST. 
217, 217 (2010).  
 9. 3 Thorne, supra note 8, at xliii.  
 10. Bratton came from the village of Bratton Fleming in Devonshire. Several 
of the early manuscripts of the treatise name the author as Henry de Bratton, 
which probably became Henry de Bracton by way of a scribal error. In Gothic 
script, c’s and t’s look very similar, and it would be easy to mistake one for the 
other. Paul Brand, Bratton, Henry of (d. 1268), OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL 
BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxforddnb.com.gate.lib.buffalo.edu/view/article/3163 
(last visited June 16, 2012).  
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the Roman model.11 The authors attempted to create a legal 
system using Roman law as their framework. They were 
heavily invested in showing that the practices of the 
English royal courts, practices which they themselves 
administered as royal justices, could be understood through 
the lens of Roman law. They wanted to prove that the work 
that they performed in the royal courts was part of an 
international system of ius commune. This made them, in a 
sense, the common law’s first comparativists. 
In trying to reconcile English practice with Roman law, 
however, the authors of Bracton discovered that it was 
difficult to make the Roman language of property fit with 
what they knew about the relationship between people and 
land. The Bracton authors twist Roman law to fit with their 
own perceptions of landholding. We have texts that provide 
us with more conventional readings of Roman law from the 
thirteenth century, among them Azo of Bologna’s Summae 
on the Institutes and the Codex, which the authors of 
Bracton relied upon heavily, and a series of Roman law 
lectures that were written in England around the year 
1200.12 Treating these texts as a baseline for contemporary 
understandings of Roman law and then turning to the ways 
the authors of Bracton twist those understandings, we can 
get a sense of how the royal justices’ conceptions of the 
relationship between people and land differed from those of 
the jurists in the universities.  
In Part I of this article, I will describe the three 
languages that provided the vocabulary for the authors of 
treatises: the Anglo-French vernacular of landholding, the 
writs of the royal courts, and Roman law. In Part II, I will 
look at the ways the Glanvill author began to mix all three 
  
 11. Bracton’s relationship to Roman law has long been noted by historians. 
Henry Sumner Maine thought that Bracton had “put off on his countrymen as a 
compendium of pure English law a treatise of which the entire form and a third 
of the contents were directly borrowed from the Corpus Juris . . . .” HENRY 
SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 82 (16th ed. 1897). Although Maine’s assertion 
that one-third of the treatise is borrowed from the Roman Corpus Iuris Civilis is 
certainly an exaggeration, the authors of Bracton did take their organization 
from Roman law and borrowed extensively from both ancient and contemporary 
Roman law texts. See discussion infra, Part III. 
 12. AZO, SUMMA AZONIS SIVE LOCUPLES IURIS CIVILIS THESAURUS (1581); THE 
TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW IN ENGLAND AROUND 1200, at xx, liv (Francis De 
Zulueta & Peter Stein eds., 1990). 
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languages together. In Part III, I will discuss the Bracton 
treatise. I will look in particular at three different, 
contradictory schemes for reconciling the Roman law of 
property to the practices of the English courts that appear 
at different points in the treatise. The authors showed their 
deep commitment to placing English practice within the 
ambit of Roman law by the extreme measures they took to 
reconcile the systems even when it must have become clear 
to them that reconciliation was impossible. In Part IV, I will 
discuss why their attempts at reconciliation did not work. 
The authors were committed to the notions that all titles 
were relative and that one’s right to the land strengthened 
gradually over time. These notions were common to the 
Francophone Anglo-Norman landed elite of their time, but 
fit poorly with Roman law. The Bracton authors were thus 
required to perform some complicated verbal gymnastics to 
show that English practice could be described using the 
language of Roman law. In the conclusion, I will discuss 
what this historical example can teach us about using 
property as a category in comparative legal scholarship. 
I. THREE LANGUAGES OF LAND 
The authors of the treatises we will examine were 
essentially speaking three different, but related, languages, 
each of which had its own vocabulary and grammar to 
describe the relationship between people and land.13 When 
the last of these treatises was written, the idea of dividing 
land into “estates” as we do in the modern common law was 
still several decades in the future. In fact, the English 
would not regularly use the moniker common law to refer to 
the practices of the English courts for several decades.14 
  
 13. I do not use the term law to describe these three systems, because it 
tends to be misleading. Anglo-French elites in England were not accustomed to 
speak about their landholding in terms of law. In fact, the word lei (cognate with 
the modern French loi), was more often used in epics and romances to mean 
“religion.” LA CHANSON DE ROLAND 30, 32, 58, 66 (Ian Short ed. & trans., 2d ed. 
1990). The writ system was only described as a legal system after Roman law 
influence had entered into the equation. See discussion infra Part II. 
 14. There are a handful of examples from the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries of the phrase ius commune or commune regni ius being used to refer to 
the practices of the royal courts. JOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH 
COMMON LAW 18-19 (1996). The phrase commune ley or lex communis, from 
which we get our modern common law, first began to appear in the last decades 
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These three languages of landholding will therefore seem 
rather foreign. 
A.  The French Vernacular 
Although we do not know the identities of all of the 
authors who worked on Glanvill and Bracton, it is a safe bet 
that they had all grown up as members of the Anglo-
Norman landed elite or, at the very least, had become 
acclimated to the landed elite’s patterns of thought as they 
gained the patronage necessary to go to school and to work 
in the royal and ducal courts.15 The Francophone elites of 
England in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries shared a 
vernacular language of landholding with their counterparts 
in Northern France. English elites, who were learning to 
speak English in larger numbers by 1200, but who still 
spoke French among themselves, moved in a Northern 
French cultural world.16 They read epics and romances in 
Old French that told of wars and adventures in the 
Frankish Empire of Charlemagne and the Britain of King 
Arthur.17 These literary works often involved legal disputes 
and would have both reflected and informed the legal norms 
of this class.18 They are thus one site where we can see the 
vernacular language of landholding at work.  
The twelfth-century epic Raoul de Cambrai, which we 
know was read at the court of Henry II, describes a dispute 
over an inheritance in tenth-century France.19 The epic 
  
of the thirteenth century. See Paul Brand, Law and Custom in the English 
Thirteenth Century Common Law, in CUSTOM: THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF A 
LEGAL CONCEPT IN THE MIDDLE AGES 17, 21 (Per Andersen & Mia Münster-
Swendsen eds., 2009). 
 15. See TURNER, supra note 7, at 205-06. 
 16. See Ian Short, Language and Literature, in A COMPANION TO THE ANGLO-
NORMAN WORLD 191, 204 (Christopher Harper-Bill & Elizabeth van Houts eds., 
2002). 
 17. The oldest extant manuscript of the oldest surviving French epic, the 
Song of Roland, is written in the Anglo-Norman dialect of French. See Ian 
Short, Introduction, in LA CHANSON DE ROLAND 9 (Ian Short ed., 2d ed. 1990). 
 18. Paul Hyams, Henry II and Ganelon, 4 SYRACUSE SCHOLAR 23, 25-26 
(1983). 
 19. Gerald of Wales references a conversation he had with none other than 
Ranulph de Glanvill, the king’s justiciar, head of the royal court system, about 
the poem. Glanvill was not, unfortunately, the author of the treatise that is 
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provides us with some of the vocabulary of landholding in 
the Northern French world, and the principal metaphor for 
the relationship between people and land was indeed 
holding. The verb tenir was used to describe a person’s 
control over land, as the noun tenement could be used to 
describe the land he held.20 Indeed, the word tenant was 
used far more often than vassal in both England and 
Northern France to describe a person who held land of a 
lord.21 Before he held land, the tenant needed to be placed in 
control of it, and for this a different metaphor was used. The 
Old French verb saisir, etymologically related to a word 
meaning “to sit,” meant “to invest” or “to put in physical 
control.”22 It began to appear as a noun, saisine, the state of 
having been invested, in the twelfth century.23 England’s 
French-speaking elites thus spoke of being seated on their 
land and afterwards of holding it. 
The conflict in Raoul de Cambrai centers on the fief of 
Cambrai, which Raoul’s father had held during his lifetime. 
Upon his death, however, the Frankish emperor passes over 
Raoul, a minor at the time, in favor of a loyal, but landless, 
supporter.24 Raoul spends the early part of the poem trying 
to recover his inheritance. In the arguments of Raoul and 
his supporters before the emperor, we can see some of the 
normative arguments that one might make to claim land. 
The emperor is said to have done wrong to have deprived 
Raoul of his heritage by giving Cambrai to another man in 
fieaige or in fee.25 Raoul speaks as if the heritage is 
normative; a person who inherited his land has a stronger 
claim to it than someone who acquired it in some other way. 
The landed elite of northern France and post-Conquest 
England did indeed make a distinction between inherited 
land, which they tended not to alienate in order to preserve 
  
attributed to him. Paul Hyams, The Common Law and the French Connection, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE BATTLE CONFERENCE ON ANGLO-NORMAN STUDIES IV, 
1981 at 78, 80 (R. Allen Brown ed., 1982). 
 20. RAOUL DE CAMBRAI 40 (William Kibler ed., Sarah Kay trans., 1996). 
 21. See SUSAN REYNOLDS, FIEFS AND VASSALS 347, 388 (1994). 
 22. See ALGIRDAS JULIEN GREIMAS, DICTIONAIRE DE L’ANCIEN FRANÇAIS 42-43, 
539-40 (3d ed. 2004); RAOUL DE CAMBRAI, supra note 20, at 44. 
 23. GREIMAS, supra note 22, at 540. 
 24. RAOUL DE CAMBRAI, supra note 20, at 40. 
 25. Id. 
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it for the eldest son at the holder’s death, and acquired land, 
which the holder could alienate with relative freedom.26 The 
most famous example of this restraint on the ability to 
alienate the heritage from the head of the lignage actually 
comes from the post-Conquest context: William the 
Conqueror’s eldest son, Robert Curthose, received the 
family patrimony of the duchy of Normandy when his father 
died, but William felt free to will the kingdom of England, 
as an acquisition that was not part of the family’s ancient 
inheritance, to his second son, William Rufus.27 The lineage 
thus had a claim on the heritage that restricted the powers 
even of the current tenant to alienate it. Raoul is not just 
concerned that the emperor has given away his heritage, 
however; he is also concerned that he has given it in fieaige. 
In twelfth-century English charters, the word fee usually 
meant that the land was held in such a manner that it was 
heritable, although this was not always the case.28 Stephen 
White has demonstrated that words like fee were 
contestable. To a lord, the word fee might imply a grant only 
for life; to a tenant, it might mean a heritable grant.29 Raoul 
himself uses the term in both senses. When he is being 
deprived of his own land, Raoul invokes his right to inherit 
the fee.30 When he later asks the emperor to grant him the 
fee of another deceased baron, he treats it as a mere life 
estate that that baron’s children have no right to inherit.31 
  
 26. JOHN HUDSON, LAND, LAW, AND LORDSHIP IN ANGLO-NORMAN ENGLAND 
204-06 (1994) (noting that land that had been acquired during the tenant’s life 
or the tenant’s father’s life was more freely alienable without the family’s 
permission than the family’s ancient inheritance was). 
 27. FRANK BARLOW, WILLIAM RUFUS 47-48 (1983) (discussing Orderic Vitalis’s 
account of William the Conqueror’s death, and his bequest of England, as an 
acquisition, to William Rufus). 
 28. HUDSON, supra note 26, at 94-97. Paul Hyams has argued, however, that 
the fee was not always associated with heritability. Paul R. Hyams, Notes on the 
Transformation of the Common Law Fief into the Common Law Tenure in Fee, 
in LAWS, LAWYERS, AND TEXTS: STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL HISTORY IN HONOUR 
OF PAUL BRAND (Susanne Jenks et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2011). 
 29. Stephen D. White, The Discourse of Inheritance in Twelfth-Century 
France: Alternative Models of the Fief in Raoul de Cambrai, in LAW AND 
GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND AND NORMANDY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR 
JAMES HOLT 173, 179-80 (George Garnett & John Hudson eds., 1994). 
 30. See id. at 179. 
 31. See id. at 180. 
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Even if the word is contestable, a grant of Raoul’s 
inheritance to someone else in (potentially heritable) fieaige 
threatens Raoul’s claim and the claim his descendants 
would have after him.32  
Raoul’s supporters also use the language of right (droit), 
a term that often appears in English land disputes in the 
twelfth century.33 Raoul’s mother, Alais, goads Raoul into 
fighting for Cambrai as “your right” (ton droit).34 The term 
was difficult to define, even for contemporaries, because it 
was thought to be quasi-mystical.35 Questions of right were 
submitted to trial by battle or ordeal, which elicited God’s 
judgment, in England and Northern France.36 It seems that 
there were doubts about the efficacy even of God’s 
judgment, because the process by which it was obtained was 
riddled with various human interventions that had the 
potential to throw off the proceedings.37 When Henry II 
allowed certain cases brought by writ of right to be decided 
by juries, and thus by purely human means, the human 
jurors were asked only who had the greater right.38 They 
could not know who had absolute right, since this was 
known to God alone.39 
  
 32. RAOUL DE CAMBRAI, supra note 20, at 40. 
 33. Id. at 74, 78, 92. 
 34. Id. at 92. Several other characters say that Raoul “has right.” Id. at 74, 
78. 
 35. Paul R. Hyams, Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common 
Law, in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SAMUEL E. 
THORNE 106 (Morris S. Arnold et al. eds., 1981) (“[T]he mystery of seisin and 
right, for example, or the question of who ought to hold land under dispute in 
Domesday invasiones, was much less easily abstracted from the divine 
judgment.”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Paul Hyams, The Legal Revolution and the Discourse of Dispute in the 
Twelfth Century, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MEDIEVAL ENGLISH CULTURE 
63-64 (Andrew Galloway ed., 2011) (arguing that, while the late twelfth century 
showed no crisis of faith about the ordeal, the literature of the time does provide 
numerous examples of ordeals that are misinterpreted by their human 
observers). 
 38. See EARLY REGISTERS OF WRITS 6 (Elsa de Haas & G.D.G. Hall eds., 1970); 
GLANVILL, supra note 4, at 30. 
 39. Donald Sutherland thought that the assize of novel disseisin was 
originally designed as a lesser writ than the writ of right, which was decided by 
trial by battle, in order to assuage the elites’ fears that their landholding would 
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The most important aspects of this vernacular language 
to keep in mind are that heritability had a strong normative 
force; the rights of lineages were as much at stake in 
property disputes as the rights of individuals. People felt 
that the heir of the last person who held the land, Raoul, for 
example, had a strong claim to the right, the emperor’s 
grant notwithstanding. But no human being could know 
who had the right in an absolute sense, so the Anglo-
Norman landed elite concerned themselves primarily with 
questions of who, between two claimants, had a better right 
to the land, and imagined an absolute right, good against all 
the world, as something that was beyond practical reach. 
B.  The Language of Writs 
The Anglo-French vernacular influenced and 
intertwined with the second language that the early treatise 
authors spoke: the language of writs. All of our authors 
worked in the courts of twelfth- and thirteenth-century 
  
be subject to juries rather than to God. The fact that a loser in an assize of novel 
disseisin might still bring a writ of right and obtain God’s judgment through 
trial by battle “guaranteed that a man might hold his lands freely in reliance on 
himself under God and not subject to the king’s will or to the word of such of his 
neighbors as might happen to be sworn on a jury.” DONALD W. SUTHERLAND, THE 
ASSIZE OF NOVEL DISSEISIN 37 (1973). Paul Hyams thinks that the jury may have 
originally have been justified as a form of divine judgment in order to sell it to 
landholders who were used to having their land disputes settled by duels. 
Hyams, supra note 35, at 118. 
The idea that right was knowable to God alone was also familiar to Roman 
jurists. The author of the second introduction to the Bracton treatise, probably 
William of Ralegh, quotes the Institutes’ definition of justice: “the constant and 
unfailing will to give to each his right.” 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 23; see also  
J.INST.1.1. He then goes on to reproduce Azo of Bologna’s commentary on the 
passage, in which Azo explains how we can refer to human acts as just even 
though perfect justice belongs to God alone. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 23. 
Azo points out that God “gives to each man in accordance with his deserts” and 
“is neither variable nor inconstant in his dispositions and wills.” AZO, supra note 
12, at 1047. For justice to be perfect, it must be perfectly constant. According to 
Azo and Ralegh, human beings can also be said to be just even though they are 
variable and inconstant in their actions, because humans can have a constant 
and unfailing will to give to each his right, even if they will inevitably fail in the 
execution of that will. Thus, human beings are incapable of being perfectly just 
and giving to each his right, but they can intend to be perfectly just. Only God 
can be perfectly just in the execution. Id. at 1047; 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 
23. 
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England, which ran on these short, Latin-language 
documents. A writ was simply an order from the king.40 
Henry II (r. 1154–1189) and his councilors had 
revolutionized their use in the royal administration in 
England and the ducal administration in Normandy, 
although the Angevin king did not introduce them in the 
other parts of his vast continental domain.41 Henry 
introduced a series of writs de cursu, which anyone could 
acquire from the royal chancery by paying a small fee.42 
These new writs could be used to start proceedings in the 
royal courts.43 The most important for our purposes will be 
the writs that were used to settle disputes over land held in 
lay fee, i.e., not by the church in free alms. The procedures 
these writs set into motion were called assizes or 
recognitions.44 Assize, like seisin, was etymologically related 
to the verb “to sit,” and probably originally referred to the 
sittings of the king’s council where these procedures were 
created.45 Assize also became the usual term for the royal 
orders, somewhat like early statutes, that came out of these 
sittings.46 It was eventually attached to the writs 
themselves and to the juries of twelve men who decided 
cases under those writs.47 The word recognition was used to 
refer to the panel of jurors who came to recognize 
(recognoscere) whether certain events had happened.48 The 
assize of novel disseisin could be sought by a person who 
had been recently ejected from his land (the word novel in 
the name of the writ means recent; the word disseisin refers 
to the ejectment or dispossession). The assize of mort 
d’ancestor aided a person who was the nearest heir of the 
  
 40. M.T. CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD: ENGLAND 1066–1307, 
at 90-91 (2d ed. 1993).  
 41. Daniel Power, Henry, Duke of the Normans (1149/50-1189), in HENRY II, 
NEW INTERPRETATIONS 95, 102 (Christopher Harper-Bill & Nicholas Vincent 
eds., 2007).  
 42. 1 THE 1235 SURREY EYRE 27 (C.A.F. Meekings ed., 1979). 
 43.  See HUDSON, supra note 14, at 143. 
 44. See GLANVILL, supra note 4, at 149.  
 45. GREIMAS, supra note 22, at 42-43. 
 46. H.G. RICHARDSON & G.O. SAYLES, LAW AND LEGISLATION FROM 
ÆTHELBERHT TO MAGNA CARTA 102-03 (1966). 
 47. Id. at 108-09.  
 48. GLANVILL, supra note 4, at 150. 
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last person to die seised of a piece of land.49 Both of these 
writs ordered the sheriff to summon a jury to appear before 
the king’s justices and thus brought the case directly to the 
king’s courts.50 The writ of right was somewhat different. 
The writ of right patent, available to all freemen who did 
not hold land directly of the king, was addressed to the 
plaintiff’s lord and commanded him to do right to the 
plaintiff with a warning that if he did not, the sheriff would 
take the case into his hands.51 Once someone sued on this 
writ, the case could easily be transferred to the king’s 
court.52 The writ of right could be decided by a trial by battle 
or put to a jury by way of a procedure called the grand 
assize, which was introduced later in Henry II’s reign as an 
alternative to trial by battle.53 
The language that the writs used would eventually 
become a technical vocabulary of its own, but the royal 
councilors who drafted these writs drew on the languages 
that they already knew. There has been debate about 
whether Roman law played any part in the drafting of 
Henry II’s writs.54 If it did, and I think it doubtful that it 
played much of a role, it has left no mark on the language of 
the writs themselves. Despite the fact that the writs were 
written in Latin, the drafters took their inspiration from the 
Anglo-French vernacular. Mort d’ancestor speaks of being 
seised (Latinized as seisitus or saisitus) of the land and 
novel disseisin speaks of being disseised (disseisivit).55 The 
  
 49. Mort d’ancestor only aided the nearest heir if that heir was a child, 
brother, sister, nephew, or niece of the deceased landholder. In the thirteenth 
century, the royal courts developed other writs for parents (the writ of aiel), 
grandparents (besaiel), and all other relatives (cosinage). Contemporaries 
viewed these writs as part of a family of writs. See EARLY REGISTERS, supra note 
38, at 280.  
 50. 3 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 57, 249. 
 51. 4 Id. at 47. 
 52. 4 Id. at 47-48. 
 53. EARLY REGISTERS, supra note 38, at 6. 
 54. For two recent summaries of this debate, see Anne J. Duggan, Roman, 
Canon and Common law in Twelfth-Century England: The council of 
Northampton (1164) Re-Examined, 83 HIST. RES. 379, 397-99 (2010) and Joshua 
C. Tate, Ownership and Possession in the Early Common Law, 48 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 280, 281 (2006). 
 55. 3 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 57, 249. 
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writs of right used the Latin terms ius and rectum.56 Both of 
these terms could be translated into English as right, and it 
would seem that the drafters were using them as Latin 
translations of the Old French droit or, in its Anglo-French 
form, dreit. So when a plaintiff in the English king’s courts 
of the thirteenth century claimed land as “his right” (ius 
suum), he was making essentially the same claim that 
Raoul de Cambrai’s mother wanted her son to make when 
she told him to go fight for Cambrai as “your right” (ton 
droit).57 
It was up to the justices and litigants of the late twelfth 
and early thirteenth centuries to transform the words in 
writs into terms of art. The writ procedures began to delimit 
the range of meanings a particular word might have. The 
assize of novel disseisin begins, “The king to the sheriff, 
greeting. Such a one has complained to us that such a one 
disseised him wrongfully and without judgment of his free 
tenement in such a vill . . . .”58 The words free tenement 
literally imply only that the land is held (tenement comes 
from the Latin tenere or the French tenir, “to hold”) and is 
held freely, i.e., not as a villein, or serf, would hold land.59 
As litigants purchased writs of novel disseisin to bring their 
cases to the royal courts, the justices had to decide what 
types of landholding the assize would cover. They decided 
that it would not cover a person holding land for a term.60 As 
  
 56. 4 Id. at 47. The writ itself was called a breve de recto and ordered the 
plaintiff’s lord to do full right (plenum rectum), but when the question was put 
to a jury by way of the grand assize, the question was who had the greater right 
(maius ius) in the land. Id. at 47, 56. The praecipe in capite used the term ius in 
the writ itself. Id. 
 57. RAOUL DE CAMBRAI, supra note 20, at 92. 
 58. 3 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 57 (emphasis added). 
 59. The author of GLANVILL appears to use free tenement in this general sense 
at times. GLANVILL, supra note 4, at 28 (“[The grand assize] takes account so 
effectively of both human life and civil condition that all men may preserve the 
rights which they have in any free tenement . . . .”). 
 60. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 39, at 32. This was possibly because when a 
landholder transferred his land to a termor, the parties traditionally did not 
undertake a ceremony known as livery of seisin. This ceremony symbolically 
transferred seisin of the land from one party to the other. Since seisin was not 
transferred to the termor, the termor had no seisin and could not be disseised. 
Since the assize gave the action to a person who was disseised, the termor could 
not have an assize of novel disseisin. See id. at 32-33. 
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a result, the lease for a term was not considered a free 
tenement even though, according to the literal meaning of 
the words, it should have been. A free tenement came to be 
defined as a piece of land that was covered by the assize. 
American common law preserves the technical language of 
the assize; it still labels leaseholds as nonfreehold estates, 
even though this makes little sense given the literal 
meaning of the words.61 To rent an apartment is not to hold 
land as a villein would. The justices and litigants of the 
early common law thus transformed the vernacular terms 
that had made their way into writs into a technical 
language of writ practice. 
C.  Roman Law 
Finally, the authors of all three of these treatises had 
become familiar with the language of Roman and canon law. 
Roman law had been undergoing a revival in the twelfth 
century.62 Although the sequence of events is murky, by the 
middle of the twelfth century at the latest there were people 
systematically teaching Roman law in the Italian city of 
Bologna.63 Canon law developed into an academic discipline 
around this time, too, with the publication of Gratian’s 
Concordance of Discordant Canons, a collection of 
authoritative Church texts used as a textbook in the 
Bologna schools from the middle of the century.64 Which of 
the two disciplines led the developments in Bologna is not 
clear.65 What is clear is that by the end of the twelfth 
century, Roman and canon law had become intertwined. 
While they were distinct academic disciplines with separate 
faculties in the universities, students in each were required 
to learn quite a bit of the other.66 They operated according to 
  
 61. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 419 (7th ed. 2010). 
 62. PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 43 (1999). 
 63. See Harry Dondorp & Eltjo J.H. Schrage, The Sources of Medieval 
Learned Law, in THE CREATION OF THE IUS COMMUNE: FROM CASUS TO REGULA 7, 
31 (John W. Cairns & Paul J. du Plessis eds., 2010). 
 64. See ANDERS WINROTH, THE MAKING OF GRATIAN’S DECRETUM 1-2 (2000).  
 65. Id. at 2-4. 
 66. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: 
CANONISTS, CIVILIANS, AND COURTS 237-38 (2008). 
2012] PROPERTY BEFORE PROPERTY 1153 
very similar principles and contemporaries spoke of them as 
forming a single ius commune (common law).67  
The Roman law that concerns us here is not the 
classical Roman law of the Augustan period, or even 
necessarily the law as it was taught in Bologna. Rather, we 
will be concerned with Roman law as it would have been 
understood by an English justice with a few years of Roman 
law training living in the late twelfth or early thirteenth 
century. Canon law was the law of the ecclesiastical courts 
in England and our authors may have encountered ius 
commune principles there, but in the treatises themselves 
the Roman and canon law we encounter is presented in the 
style of the schools, as a textualized, academic law. We 
know that our English authors had training in Roman and 
canon law by the references they make to the two laws in 
their texts. The author of Glanvill used Justinian’s 
Institutes, a sixth-century legal textbook.68 The authors of 
Bracton used Justinian’s Digest and Codex as well.69 More 
importantly, they borrowed extensively from Azo of 
Bologna’s Summa Institutorum and Summa Codicis, two 
commentaries on the sixth-century sources by an early 
thirteenth-century Roman law glossator, which show us the 
ways that people in the medieval schools were reading the 
ancient texts.70 The authors of Bracton also had several 
thirteenth-century procedural manuals of Roman and canon 
law in their collection and had access to Gratian’s 
Concordance of Discordant Canons and the Decretals of 
Gregory IX, both collections of Church law.71  
The authors probably did not learn about the two laws 
that composed the ius commune entirely from books. The 
texts were meant to be used as part of a scholastic training 
  
 67. HELMHOLZ, supra note 3, at 20. 
 68. See Hall, Introduction to GLANVILL, supra note 4, at xxxvi. 
 69. For examples, see 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 19, 299, 306. 
 70. See generally SELECT PASSAGES FROM THE WORKS OF BRACTON AND AZO 
(Frederic William Maitland ed., 1895) (comparing the Romanesque portions of 
Bracton’s treatise with Azo of Bologna’s writings). 
 71. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 22 (citing the Decretals of Gregory IX); id. at 
27 (citing Gratian’s Decretum); see generally H.G. Richardson, Azo, Drogheda, 
and Bracton, 59 ENG. HIST. REV. 22 (1944) (discussing the influence of Azo, a 
teacher and a famous Summa writer in Bologna, and William of Drogheda, a 
thirteenth-century Oxford canonist, on Bracton). 
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program. This training would have been available to them 
in several different places. Every cathedral had a school, 
and depending on the schoolmaster and his background, the 
cathedral might offer some training in law as part of a 
general course that could also cover theology, medicine, and 
the arts.72 The first universities were appearing in Europe 
by the second half of the twelfth century, as well. A few 
Englishmen and Normans traveled to Bologna, but from at 
least the early decades of the thirteenth century, Oxford 
was also an option for legal studies.73 We are fortunate that 
a set of lectures on the Institutes, written in England 
around the year 1200, have survived.74 Our authors may 
have heard these very lectures. At the very least, they are 
evidence of the interpretations of Roman law current in 
England’s schools at that time, the kinds of interpretations 
that the authors would have been familiar with. 
That education taught the authors of these treatises to 
think about law in particular ways. Law was not a collection 
of court procedures; law was an internally coherent system. 
Justinian’s Digest made a point of saying in one of its 
introductions that it contained no contradictions.75 Gratian’s 
Concordance of Discordant Canons was built around the 
idea of bringing order to a disorderly collection of 
authorities. Gratian placed authoritative texts that 
appeared to conflict with each other side-by-side and 
demonstrated that, if read properly, they did not conflict at 
all.76 This scholastic method of law was characterized by a 
  
 72. NICHOLAS ORME, ENGLISH SCHOOLS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 79 (1973). The 
Third Lateran Council of 1179 required that every cathedral maintain at least 
one master to teach the clerics and “poor scholars.” R.W. SOUTHERN, THE 
MAKING OF THE MIDDLE AGES 194 (1953). 
 73. Thomas Becket was sent to Bologna to study law for one year while he 
was a cleric in Archbishop Theobald’s household. FRANK BARLOW, THOMAS 
BECKET 36-37 (1986). By 1174, the community of English students in Bologna 
was substantial enough to endow an altar dedicated to the newly canonized St. 
Thomas Becket in one of the city’s churches. BRUNDAGE, supra note 66, at 224. 
Oxford was already an important center of learning in the 1190s, but Cambridge 
would not get off the ground as a center of studies until the 1220s or 1230s. See 
id. at 238-40. 
 74. These lectures have been edited in TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW, supra note 
12. 
 75. DIG. (Justinian, Constitutio Tanta 15). 
 76. See JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 47 (1995). 
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love of distinction, categorization, and taxonomy. Law was 
divided into public and private; civil and criminal; persons, 
things, and actions.77  
These authors would have had little opportunity to see 
Roman law in action, however. Their one opportunity might 
have been the ecclesiastical courts. Those courts used canon 
law and all three of the possible contributors to the Bracton 
treatise held ecclesiastical benefices, which might have led 
them to be involved with the church courts.78 Canon law had 
adopted the language of property and possession from 
Roman law and, although few records survive from the 
English ecclesiastical courts in this period, the Bracton 
authors could have had some experience with possessory 
and proprietary actions in that setting.79 Otherwise, Roman 
law was something to be learned through books and in 
classrooms. Although the works of the ancient and medieval 
jurists are extremely detailed and subtle—Azo’s summae 
together run more than 1200 pages in their earliest printed 
editions—Roman law’s flexibility in practice might have 
been lost on the twelfth- and thirteenth-century justices.80 
The process of bringing Roman law into court practice was a 
work of legal translation; the justices were trying to learn to 
speak a foreign language when they learned Roman law, 
and they were working to learn the strict rules of grammar 
  
 77. See J. INST. 1.2.12, 4.18.pr-1. 
 78. Brand, supra note 10; David Crook, Raleigh, William of (d. 1250), in 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxforddnb. 
com.gate.lib.buffalo.edu/view/article/23042 (last visited June 16, 2012); Alan 
Harding, Pattishall, Martin of (d. 1229), in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL 
BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxforddnb.com.gate.lib.buffalo.edu/view/article/21542 
(last visited June 16, 2012). 
 79. Mary Cheney has placed the key developments in the adoption of the 
language of possession and property in England’s church courts in the period 
between 1140 and 1160. The distinction between possessory and proprietary 
actions was certainly well-established in the ecclesiastical courts by the 1220s. 
Mary Cheney, Possessio/Proprietas in Ecclesiastical Courts in mid-twelfth-
century England, in LAW AND GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND AND 
NORMANDY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR JAMES HOLT 245, 253 (George Garnett & 
John Hudson eds., 1994). 
 80. AZO, supra note 12; PETER GARNSEY & CAROLINE HUMFRESS, THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE LATE ANTIQUE WORLD 60-61 (2001) (arguing that the codes 
promulgated by late Roman emperors tend to make the law appear rigid and 
obscure the work of local jurists and parties in working out the law on the 
ground).  
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rather than the flexible colloquialisms of practice. 
Additionally, their knowledge of Roman law may not have 
been very deep. None of these three justices is ever 
described in the rolls as magister, the title usually accorded 
in the records to justices who had taken degrees in the 
schools.81 Their periods of training in Roman and canon law 
may have been short, just long enough for major 
distinctions and general principles to imprint on their 
minds. Thus, as we will see, the idea of property as an 
absolute right, good against the world, which the Bracton 
authors took from Roman law, was adopted into the treatise 
without recognition of its exceptions and qualifications at 
Roman law. Their first experience applying this law would 
have been when they tried to reconcile it to the workings of 
the English courts, and this is when they would have begun 
to work through situations where the general rules and 
principles did not work very well.  
The distinctions that Roman law scholars made in the 
realm of property law concern us most here. In the Roman 
law of the sixth century, the law of the Justinianic period, 
property was not a major division of the law as it is in 
modern common law. There would have been no first-year 
course on property. The Institutes is divided into sections on 
persons, things, and actions. The discussions of property 
and possession appear primarily in the sections on things 
and actions. The word thing (res) could have a broad range 
of meanings at Roman law. Although it is never defined in 
the Institutes, in the section on things it appears to mean 
anything with which a human being can have a property 
relationship, whether it be something corporeal, like a 
house, or incorporeal, like a servitude or an obligation.82  
  
 81. TURNER, supra note 7, at 150, 226. 
 82. See generally J. INST. 2.3 (discussing servitudes); J. INST. 2.2.2 (defining 
obligations and inheritances). There are some things that can be owned by no 
one, but which are nevertheless things. The sea shore is the prime example. The 
authors of the Institutes raise this example, however, because it is surprising 
that there is a thing that can be owned by no one. In fact, as the authors of the 
Institutes point out, there was a difference of opinion on the matter. While some 
jurists imagined the sea shore to be owned by no one, others imagined it to be 
owned by all people in common. J. INST. 2.1.5. The statement that the sea shore 
is incapable of ownership is thus a legal conclusion rather than a statement 
about the sea shore’s reification. It is presumably a thing and a human being 
could presumably have a property relationship with it if not for the law’s 
prohibition.  
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It is significant that the law of things appears before the 
law of actions in the text, because the law of things is not 
just physically prior to the law of actions; it is also 
conceptually prior to the law of actions.83 Abstract concepts 
come before the concrete actions that put them into practice. 
When the author of the lectures on the Institutes written in 
England around the turn of the thirteenth century turns 
from the law of things, which ends with a subsection on 
obligations, to the law of actions, he tells us that actions are 
treated after obligations because “actions . . . arise from 
obligations.”84 The reader of the Institutes and the hearer of 
the lectures is led to think of law not as a set of court 
practices, but as an abstract system that is put into practice 
through those court practices. 
The medieval jurists constructed a systematic law of 
property—systematized well beyond what the classical 
jurists or Justinian had done—out of Justinian’s texts. In 
the writings of the medieval jurists, property was ceasing to 
be a concept within the law of things and was becoming a 
major division of the law in its own right. The author of our 
lectures on the Institutes began his commentary on the 
section on things by telling us it is about property: “And so 
[the section] on things concerns showing which things (res) 
are subjected to our ownership (dominium, a synonym for 
proprietas) and which are not.”85  
The twelfth- and thirteenth-century jurists conceived of 
landholding primarily through the concepts of property 
(proprietas, dominium) and possession (possessio). Our 
modern word property is derived from the Latin proprietas, 
which is related to the Latin word propria, an adjective 
  
 83. J. INST. 2.1 (beginning of section on things); J. INST. 4.6 (beginning of 
section on actions). 
 84. TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW, supra note 12, at 116. It is less clear whether 
Roman law of the classical period—i.e., the early empire—placed concepts or 
rights conceptually prior to actions. Hans Peter has argued that the classical 
jurists thought primarily in terms of actions rather than rights or abstract 
concepts. HANS PETER, ACTIO UND WRIT 56-57 (1957). Peter Garnsey has argued 
that the jurists of the classical period were concerned with abstract rights and 
had a concept of an individual, subjective right to property. PETER GARNSEY, 
THINKING ABOUT PROPERTY 180-81 (2007). 
 85. TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW, supra note 12, at 29 (I have modified de 
Zulueta and Stein’s translation) (“De Rebus itaque agit, ostendens que res 
dominio nostro subiciuntur et que non.”). 
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meaning “[my] own.” Proprietas is thus something that is 
one’s own, and can be literally rendered into English as 
ownership.86 Dominium, which is related to domus (house) 
and dominus (lord), was used interchangeably with 
proprietas in the Roman law texts.87  
Property was a right in rem, good against all the 
world.88 That is to say that the action by which one 
recovered one’s property, called a vindicatio, mentioned only 
the plaintiff and the thing claimed, not the defendant.89 The 
question at issue was whether A was the owner of the thing, 
absolutely and against all comers, not whether A had better 
title in the thing than B as we would ask in modern 
common law systems.90 Roman law scholars imagined 
property as absolute in another way as well. Property was 
the sum total of three rights that, together, gave one 
absolute control of the thing, at least as the jurists imagined 
absolute control. These three rights were called usus (the 
right to use the thing), fructus (the right to take its fruits), 
and abusus (the right to dispose of the thing).91 Jurists 
thought of property as the conjunction of the three, subject 
to servitudes, which might temporarily alienate the owner’s 
control of the usus or fructus.92 The jurists carefully limited 
the servitude to preserve the fiction that the owner was 
supreme. The typical example of a servitude was the 
  
 86. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, s.v. “ownership” (2d. ed. 1991) (“The 
fact or state of being an owner; legal right of possession; property, 
proprietorship, dominion.”). 
 87. ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 441 (1953). 
 88. See J. INST.4.6.1; AZO, supra note 12, at 1118; TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW, 
supra note 12, at 111; D.L. Carey Miller, Property, in A COMPANION TO 
JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES 42-43 (Ernest Metzger ed., 1998).  
 89. See J. INST.4.6.1; AZO, supra note 12, at 1118; TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW, 
supra note 12, at 111; see also Miller, supra note 88, at 47 (“The right of 
ownership is protected by a vindicatory action . . . . The applicable form of 
procedure involved the assertion of a claim to the actual thing.”).  
 90. Ernest Metzger, Actions, in A COMPANION TO JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 218 
(Ernest Metzger ed., 1998); Miller, supra note 88, at 45 (“[O]wnership is a 
distinct paramount right rather than a mere label attaching to the most 
compelling of two or more competing claims to a thing.”).  
 91. TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW, supra note 12, at 35 (discussing the right to use 
and the right to take the fruits as part of the usufruct); Miller, supra note 88, at 
45.  
 92. See J. INST. 2.4.pr-1.  
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usufruct, which combined usus and fructus.93 The usufruct 
left the owner with only the abusus, but the usus and the 
fructus could only be alienated for short periods of time94. 
The owner could specify that the usufruct would last for a 
specific amount of time or for the usufructuary’s life. In 
either event, the usufruct returned to the owner no later 
than the usufructuary’s death; it could not be passed to 
anyone else by sale, gift, or inheritance.95 These restrictions 
on alienation preserved property’s status as the absolute 
right in the minds of jurists.96 Thus, the simple, take-home 
message of most Roman law texts was that property was an 
absolute, indivisible right good against the world. The 
English justices seem to have picked up this message. 
Property was contrasted with possession: according to 
the Digest, “property has nothing in common with 
possession.”97 Property was an abstract legal right. 
Possession was the actual control of the land. Property was 
protected by an action. Possession was protected by an 
interdict, a type of procedure that was not properly 
considered an action by the jurists.98 Where property was 
absolute, possession was relative. If A was put out of 
possession of his land by B, he could sue B on a possessory 
interdict. The interdict would decide only who, between A 
and B, had possession. It did not decide A’s rights against C 
or anyone else.99 We know that the Bracton authors were 
familiar with the bright line between possession and 
property because they quote the Digest’s insistence that the 
two have nothing in common twice.100 Other Roman legal 
texts did not distinguish quite so clearly. Azo, for instance, 
  
 93. See J. INST. 2.3-4; AZO, supra note, 12 at 1072. 
    94. See Miller, supra note 88, at 67. 
 95. See J. INST. 2.4.4; Miller, supra note 88, at 67.  
 96. See ALAN RODGER, OWNERS AND NEIGHBOURS IN ROMAN LAW 2 (1972) (“For 
the Pandectists ownership is in essence unrestricted and any limitations which 
may be placed on it are somehow alien to it and detract from its purity . . . .”). 
 97. DIG. 41.2.12 (my translation) (“Nihil commune habet proprietas cum 
possession . . . .”). 
 98. See Metzger, supra note 90, at 210.  
 99. See TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW, supra note 12, at 111. 
 100. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 321; 3 id. at 325. 
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defines actions in rem as actions based on possession.101 
Despite the jurists’ insistence that possession was a matter 
of fact rather than of law it was a fact with important legal 
significance. Possession had the potential, just as it does in 
modern law, to become an abstract legal construct. The 
classic American property case, Pierson v. Post, raised the 
question of whether a person obtained possession of a fox 
when he began to pursue it, when he had a reasonable 
chance of killing it, when he killed it, or when he held it in 
his hands.102 Only in the last of these cases can we 
unequivocally say that the fox-hunter has the fox in his 
physical control, but any of the others could, potentially, be 
labeled possession. Roman law, which is the source of the 
common law doctrine of possession, could similarly treat 
someone who is not in control as a matter of fact as the 
possessor. For transfer of possession, Roman law required 
that the possessor give up his possession corpore et animo, 
by body and by mind, meaning that he physically give up 
possession and intend to give up possession.103 Say, however, 
the possessor, A, is physically ejected from his land by B. A 
no longer has possession corpore; he has no physical control 
of the land at all. He is still legally the possessor, however, 
because he never surrendered possession animo.104 
Possession in this case can hardly be said to be a mere fact. 
It is a legal right, and, according to Justinian’s texts, A 
could sue B using the interdict unde vi to recover his land.105 
The doctrine that one had to possess both animo and 
corpore was appealing to the Bracton authors, who used it 
throughout the treatise. 
The authors of Glanvill and Bracton were writing 
within a tradition that saw the ius commune as a universal 
law and saw English court practices as part of that larger 
  
 101. AZO, supra note 12, at 1119 (“There are however those [actions] in rem, 
which are given against anyone by reason of possession, i.e., because he has the 
thing, or possesses it.”) (my translation) (“Sunt autem illae in rem, quae dantur 
contra aliquem ratione possessionis, id est, quia habet rem, vel possidet.”). 
 102. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805). 
 103. AZO, supra note 12, at 740. The corpore et animo requirement has been 
incorporated into the common law of gifts, which require both delivery and 
intent to make a gift. 
 104. Id. at 740. 
 105. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 296. 
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ius commune.106 Ius commune was the system of which 
English custom was a local instantiation. We are not 
accustomed to think about the early common law this way 
because civil law is generally seen, and sees itself, as 
common law’s opposite. On the common law side, scholars 
have worked hard to explain why England was so unique in 
its legal development.107 Somehow the English royal courts 
resisted the reception of Romano-canonical procedure that 
occurred in places like France and Italy in the thirteenth 
century and the more widespread reception of Roman 
  
 106. Manlio Bellomo has made similar arguments for other parts of Europe. 
Bellomo has argued that historians who see the ius commune as merely a 
subsidiary law, to be cited only when no appropriate local law could be found on 
point, do so because they inappropriately treat the ius commune as a positive 
law. Bellomo demonstrates that, rather than providing specific rules and laws, 
ius commune provided a set of unchanging structures and principles through 
which jurists could interpret the ius proprium, the local law of the place. The ius 
commune was the unchanging form of law and the ius proprium was the 
instantiation of that form. MANLIO BELLOMO, THE COMMON LEGAL PAST OF 
EUROPE 1000-1800, at 152-53 (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 1995). Bellomo 
specifically treats the Sicilian Liber Augustalis of 1231, which created a 
hierarchy among laws. A judge deciding a case was to turn to the law of the 
kingdom first. If there was no royal law on point, he could then turn to the 
customs of the locality. If neither of those provided the answer, only then could 
he turn to ius commune. The ius commune thus comes last, as a subsidiary law 
to be used only when all local law has run out. Bellomo points out that it is only 
the specific provisions of Roman and canon law that the Liber Augustalis places 
in an inferior position to ius proprium. The structures, principles, and 
terminology of the ius commune infused all of the laws of the kingdom of Sicily, 
including the Liber Augustalis itself, which is heavily influenced by Roman law. 
Id. at 89-94. 
 107. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 28 (4th ed. 
2002) (arguing that Roman law found a highly developed legal system that was 
difficult to supplant when it arrived in England in the twelfth and sixteenth 
centuries); R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 90-92 
(2d ed. 1988) (arguing that England’s period of legal development pre-dated the 
continent’s by half a century and produced a workable court system before 
Roman influence could reach England); see also 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK AND 
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF 
EDWARD I 135 (2d ed. 1898) [hereinafter POLLOCK & MAITLAND] (“Our English 
law shows itself strong enough to assimilate foreign ideas and convert them to 
its own use. Of any wholesale ‘reception’ of Roman law there is no danger. From 
the day at Clarendon onwards it is plain that we have many consuetudines 
which must be maintained in the teeth of leges and canones.”). 
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substantive law in later centuries.108 An oft-quoted 
explanation was offered by the German scholar Heinrich 
Brunner around the turn of the twentieth century. Brunner 
thought that England had received a bit of Roman law early 
on, in Henry II’s reforms and in texts like the Bracton 
treatise, and that this small reception of Roman law had 
“operated as a sort of prophylactic inoculation, and had 
rendered the national law immune against destructive 
infection.”109 “Prophylactic” generally has a more specific 
meaning today than it did in Brunner’s time, making it an 
unfortunate choice of words for reasons that Brunner 
probably could not have foreseen. This metaphor, which 
gives us an inherently negative view of civil law, has been 
repeated in much more recent common law histories.110 
When historians of the common law repeat the prophylactic 
metaphor in a world where we associate common law with 
England and civil law with the continent it conjures up 
images of the seductive civil law threatening to infect the 
common law with the wicked French disease. 
It is not only its highly negative attitude towards civil 
law that makes this metaphor inapt. The metaphor 
assumes that the common law was a healthy body that 
could be invaded by civil law in the thirteenth century. It is 
essentially a backward-looking view of history, coming at 
the problem from the situation in the modern world, where 
common law and civil law are two competing systems that 
could potentially infect (or influence, to paint it in a less 
negative light) each other. This was not the case in twelfth- 
and thirteenth-century England. The royal justices did not 
yet think of the procedures followed in the royal courts as a 
unified common law; the expression ley commune would not 
make its first appearances until the end of the thirteenth 
century.111 Rather, like their civilian counterparts, they 
thought of their law as part of an international ius 
commune. We can see this clearly in the Bracton treatise. In 
the introduction to that text, one of the text’s authors, this 
  
 108. See EDWARD PETERS, INQUISITION 52-53 (1988); see generally GERALD 
STRAUSS, LAW, RESISTANCE, AND THE STATE: THE OPPOSITION TO ROMAN LAW IN 
REFORMATION GERMANY (1986). 
 109. See Heinrich Brunner, The Sources of English Law, in SELECT ESSAYS IN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 42 (1908).  
 110. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 107, at 28. 
 111. See Brand, supra note 14, at 21.  
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one probably Henry de Bratton himself, says that “though 
in almost all lands use is made of the leges and the jus 
scriptum, England alone uses unwritten law and custom. 
There law derives from nothing written [but] from what 
usage has approved.”112 Bratton presents England as a lone 
holdout in a world that he imagines to be populated by 
textualized law. Of course, this is manifestly untrue. Very 
little of Western Christendom used ius scriptum.113 Yet, the 
author chooses to present England as unique in not using 
written law.  
In this passage, Bratton is actually using the language 
of the ius commune to highlight England’s difference from 
it. He uses the terms leges (laws) and ius scriptum (written 
law) in the same way they are used in texts like the 
Institutes and Gratian’s Decretum. The word lex is used 
throughout the Bracton treatise to refer specifically to 
Roman law.114 The clearest case appears in the tractate on 
acquiring dominion over things, a portion of the text which 
was probably written by the royal justice William of Ralegh 
during one of the early phases of writing on the treatise.115 
In one passage from this tractate, Ralegh tells us that “until 
the felony is proved, the land of a felon can never be the 
  
 112. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 19 (“Cum autem fere in omnibus regionibus 
utatur legibus et iure scripto, sola Anglia usa est in suis finibus iure non scripto 
et consuetudine.”). For the argument that Henry de Bratton wrote the 
introductio to the text, see Brand, The Age of Bracton, supra note 8, at 77. 
 113. Bratton may have known of a few recent attempts to create royal 
statutory compilations comparable, at least in the minds of their authors, with 
Justinian’s collection of imperial legislation, the Codex. Frederick II of Sicily 
had issued his Liber Augustalis in 1231. Alfonso X of Castile and León issued 
the Fuero Real between 1252 and 1255, a failed attempt to create a law for his 
whole kingdom. The kings of France issued ordonnances at various points in the 
thirteenth century, but no more often than the kings of England issued assizes 
or statuta. In Northern France, the area of the world with which the English 
had the most contact, law remained largely unwritten in the 1250s. BELLOMO, 
supra note 106, at 93, 100, 104. 
 114. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 19.  
 115. This tractate contains addiciones, or accretions to the text, that contradict 
the main text. This leads me to believe that it was written in the earlier stages 
of writing, when Ralegh was working on the treatise, and revised by one of the 
later authors, perhaps Henry de Bratton. At one point in the tractate, for 
instance, the main text says “the services must be certain and expressed in 
writing.” Id. at 62. To which someone has added, “or without a writing,” 
changing the meaning of the passage substantially.  Id. 
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escheat of the chief lord” and that, in this rule, “law (lex) 
agrees with English custom (consuetudo Anglicana): ff. de 
donationibus l. post contractum [this is a citation to 
Justinian’s Digest, D. 39.5.15], where it is said that gifts 
made after the commission of a capital crime are valid 
unless condemnation follows.”116 Ralegh is familiar with the 
distinction made in Roman and canon law texts between lex, 
which is written, and mos or consuetudo (custom), which is 
unwritten.117 He is clearly distinguishing between the 
written lex and the unwritten consuetudo in this passage, 
but he sees the two as being in accord with each other. 
Ralegh makes another important distinction in this 
passage: he feels the need to modify the word custom with 
the adjective English. The word lex, however, requires no 
modifier. He does not need to specify that the lex he refers 
to is Roman law, even though he makes it clear immediately 
afterwards that he is referring to the Digest. Roman law is 
just lex; it is the one, universal written law. This passage is 
not an outlier. Many other portions of the treatise use the 
term lex to refer to provisions of the Digest and the Codex, 
and both Ralegh and Bratton speak about Roman law as if 
it was binding authority in England.118 
  
 116. Id. at 101. (I have modified Thorne’s translation) (“[C]onvenit lex cum 
consuetudine Anglicana, ff. de donationibus l. post contractum, ubi dicitur quod 
post contractum capitale crimen donationes factae valent nisi condemnatio 
subsecuta sit.”). 
 117. See J.INST.1.2.3 (“Written law (ius scriptum) is lex [followed by several 
other categories of written law]. . . .”); J.INST.1.2.9 (“Law (ius) comes into being 
without a writing (ex non scripto) when a rule is approved by use.”) (Translation 
by Peter Birks and Grant McLeod); D.1 c.5 (“Custom, however, is a kind of ius 
instituted by usage.”). Isidore of Seville, an author with whom the Bracton 
authors were certainly familiar, and who they quote, 3 BRACTON, supra note 5, 
at 151, and id. at 360, may have actually been Ralegh and Bratton’s source for 
the distinction. See ISIDORE OF SEVILLE, ETYMOLOGIAE 5.3.2-3 (“Lex is a written 
constitution. Mos is custom proved by age, or unwritten lex. For lex is called 
from legendo, because it is written. Mos however is long custom (longa 
consuetudo) . . . . Consuetudo, however is ius instituted by customs (moribus), 
which is received for lex, when lex is lacking.”) (my translation) (“Lex est 
constitutio scripta. Mos est vetustate probata consuetudo, sive lex non scripta. 
Nam lex a legendo vocata, quia scripta est. Mos autem longa consuetudo est . . . 
. Consuetudo autem est ius quoddam moribus institutum, quod pro lege 
suscipitur, cum deficit lex.”). 
 118.  See, e.g., 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 305. (using lex to mean a Roman 
statute); id. at 323 (several direct citations to the Digest referred to by the term 
lex as part of an addition to the text that was probably made by Henry de 
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The fact that lex has a specific meaning in the treatise 
makes Bratton’s choice of it in the introduction all the more 
significant. He presents England and its law as exceptional. 
England was the lone holdout in a world that used written, 
Roman law. But then Bratton turns to defending English 
law’s place within the international legal order that was 
defined by the ius commune. Quoting Glanvill, he explains 
that:  
Nevertheless, it will not be absurd to call English laws leges, 
though they are unwritten, since whatever has been rightly 
decided and approved with the counsel and consent of the 
magnates and the general agreement of the res publica, the 
authority of the king or prince having first been added 
thereto, has the force of a [lex].
119
  
Bratton places himself on the edge of a Roman and canon 
law culture of written law and tries to convince the reader 
that England is a part of it, albeit in an unconventional 
way. English law can be described as lex, the universal law 
of the ius commune, even though it is unwritten. The 
language that makes common law and civil law into two 
competing systems belongs to a later era. 
The treatise writers of the late twelfth and early 
thirteenth centuries were administrators, landholding 
elites, and legal scholars and, as such, had to be conversant 
in all three languages. But these three languages contained 
some inherent contradictions, and, as we shall see, the 
authors of treatises worked hard, but unsuccessfully, to 
reduce the dissonance between the languages they were 
required to speak. 
II. MIXING THE LANGUAGES: THE GLANVILL TREATISE 
The treatise we generally call Glanvill is titled, in many 
of its manuscripts, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni 
Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of the Realm of 
  
Bratton); id. at 367 (using lex to refer to an excerpt from an ancient Roman 
jurist found in the Digest). 
 119. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 19 (“Sed non erit absurdum leges Anglicanas 
licet non scriptas leges appellare, cum legis vigorem habeat quidquid de consilio 
et consensu magnatum et rei publicæ communi sponsione, auctoritate regis sive 
principis præcedente, iuste fuerit definitum et approbatum.”). 
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England).120 It was written ca. 1187–1189.121 The name 
Glanvill comes from the royal justiciar at the time of its 
writing, who is mentioned in some of the manuscripts as its 
author, although the attribution is dubious.122 Glanvill is a 
Latin text which describes the procedures of the king’s 
court. Written a decade after the end of Henry II’s busiest 
period of reform, it is the earliest source we have for many 
of the writs that became so important to the common law. 
Glanvill also makes an early effort to translate English 
practice into the language of Roman law. The author takes 
the words seisin and right, words that appeared in the 
Anglo-French vernacular and in the language of writs, and 
equate them, in a direct one-to-one fashion, with the Roman 
law terms possession and property. Early in the treatise, he 
distinguishes between pleas that “concern solely claims to 
the property in the disputed subject-matter” and pleas 
where “the claim is based on possession.”123 On the 
possession side of the line, he places all those pleas “which 
are determined by recognitions,” meaning primarily those 
assizes that historians of English law know so well—novel 
disseisin, mort d’ancestor, utrum, and darrein 
presentment—and tells us that these “will be discussed 
later in their proper place.”124 When he gets to the proper 
place, book XIII on recognitions, he does not use the division 
between possession and property that he used in the 
introduction to his work. Instead, he says that he has dealt 
with “pleas about right” (placita de recto) and is now 
turning to recognitions, which are concerned “with seisins 
only.”125 The Romanist language of possession (possessio) 
and property (proprietas) that the author began with has 
morphed into the language of seisin (saisina) and right 
  
 120. GLANVILL, supra note 4, at 1. 
 121. Hall, Introduction to GLANVILL, supra note 4, at xi.  
 122. Id. at xxx-xxxiii. 
 123. GLANVILL, supra note 4, at 4. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 148 (I have modified Hall’s translation). Hall translates this phrase 
as “with seisin only,” but the Latin word he translates as “seisin,” saisinis, is 
plural. I would like to thank John Hudson for pointing this out to me. 
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(rectum), terms that would have made sense in the 
vernacular.126  
The Glanvill author understood Roman law well enough 
to see the similarities between the words seisin and right of 
their writs and Roman law’s possession and property. The 
comparison may have made sense to him for several 
reasons. First of all, in the way the words were used by the 
Anglo-Norman landed elite, being seised was something 
that happened in an instant, when the donor of the land 
invested the donee. Right was generally tied to a 
generational claim, that the land had belonged to the family 
for a long time.127 This mirrored the Roman law of 
prescription, as described by Azo and our English lecturer 
on Roman law, by which one’s possession could mature into 
a property right.128 Likewise, writs that dealt with seisin 
generally had quicker, simpler procedures associated with 
them than writs that dealt with right.129 In the same way, 
Roman actions on the possession were much quicker and 
simpler than actions on property.130 This made perfect sense 
in both cases. The action on the right or property decided 
more than the action on the seisin or the possession and 
generally precluded the parties from bringing any future 
action. So the losing party in a writ of right could not bring 
  
 126. This is not the only place in the treatise that the author makes it clear 
that he equates the Roman possession with the Anglo-French seisin and the 
Roman property with the Anglo-French right. He also speaks of pleas brought 
“on the question of property by means of a writ of right (breve de recto)” which 
he parallels later with the phrase “except on the question of right (recto) by . . . a 
writ of right.” Id. at 6, 10. 
 127. Hudson makes the point, for instance, that landholders felt more free to 
alienate land, without the lord’s permission, that had been inherited than land 
that had been acquired during one’s lifetime, since, with acquired land, the 
landholder’s relationship with the lord who had given him the land was still 
strong. As the land was inherited over several generations, though, the 
connection between land and lord became more attenuated and the connection 
between land and family became stronger. Contemporaries might have put this 
in terms of an increase in right. See HUDSON, supra note 26, at 209. 
 128. See AZO, supra note 12, at 731-39; TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW, supra note 
12, at 37.  
 129. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 39, at 35. 
 130. Frederic Joüon des Longrais, La portée politiques des réformes d’Henry II 
en matière de saisine, Quatrieme série, xv REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS 
ET ETRANGER 565-67 (1936). 
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another writ of right but also could not bring a novel 
disseisin.131 The reverse was not true. The loser in a novel 
disseisin case could bring a writ of right. So the procedure 
on the right or property had to be more rigorous than that 
on the seisin or possession. Frederic Joüon des Longrais 
called this type of procedure the “double action” (double 
procès) where there is a simple action for easy cases and a 
more complicated action for hard ones.132 He was among a 
group of historians who thought this was evidence that 
Henry II and his councilors had copied Roman models when 
they created the petty assizes and the writs of right, 
although he thought their borrowing did not go beyond the 
idea of having a double action.133 There is no real reason, 
apart from this similarity, to believe that copying was 
involved.134 The fact that the English writs and Roman 
actions had this double action in common, though, certainly 
encouraged the authors of texts like Glanvill, authors who 
were inclined to make comparisons between English and 
Roman law, to treat their writs as if they were Roman 
  
 131. See David J. Seipp, Roman Legal Categories in the Early Common Law, 
in LEGAL RECORD AND HISTORICAL REALITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH BRITISH 
LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE 9, 25 (Thomas G. Watkin ed., 1989). 
 132. Joüon des Longrais, supra note 130, at 567.  
 133. See id. at 555. (“If Roman influence appears undeniable in the appearance 
of the double action, it seems not to have guided the reforms of seisin in their 
details.”) (my translation). 
 134. Mary Cheney has demonstrated that the ecclesiastical courts in England 
were making use of the distinction between possessory and proprietary actions 
by 1160. Since royal servants in clerical orders might sit in judgment in 
ecclesiastical courts and great magnates might have their disputes heard in 
those courts, there were opportunities for Henry II’s councilors to become aware 
of the distinction. See Cheney, supra note 79, at 252-53. It is important to note, 
however, that none of the early writs use any language borrowed from Roman or 
canon law and our first evidence that anyone was thinking of them as parallels 
to Roman actions comes from the Glanvill treatise, written a decade to a 
generation after most of the writs had been created. Joshua Tate has argued 
that, by looking at the assize of darrein presentment, we can see Roman and 
canon law influence more clearly than we can in assizes that concern lay fees. 
The problems of lordship that are present in the assizes of novel disseisin and 
mort d’ancestor are absent from darrein presentment, which concerns the right 
to present to a church. See Tate, supra note 54, at 307-09. The problem with this 
argument is that darrein presentment probably post-dated novel disseisin and 
mort d’ancestor, and may simply have been based on those writs, not on Roman 
or canon law. See id. at 307. 
2012] PROPERTY BEFORE PROPERTY 1169 
actions and to treat seisin and right as if they were 
possession and property. 
Even if the Glanvill author could see parallels between 
English writs and the Roman law of possession and 
property, he did not try to work the writs into anything like 
a systematic law of property in the style of medieval Roman 
law. The Glanvill author does divide his treatise into 
sections on pleas on the property and pleas on the 
possession, but his discussion centers not on substantive 
law doctrines like property and possession, but on the writs 
that were administered by the royal courts.135 He follows 
what Maitland called a “dilemmatic” method;136 he starts 
with a fact pattern that might come before the royal courts 
and then subdivides that fact pattern, creating a sort of 
decision tree for the justice sitting in court: 
If the tenant chooses to defend himself by battle against the 
demandant, then the procedure is as stated above. But if the 
tenant prefers to put himself upon the lord king’s Grand 
Assize, then the demandant will either do the same, or he will 
not. . . . But if he is unwilling to put himself upon the assize he 
must show some cause why there should be no assize between 
them. . . . If the demandant makes this objection, the tenant 
will either admit it or not.
137
  
The author’s concern is not with a systematic set of 
laws, but with what the royal justice must do depending on 
the decisions of the parties before him. It is a very practical 
exposition of the workings of the king’s courts, not a 
systematic exposition of a field of law. If we were to use the 
categorizations of Roman law, we would say he was 
thinking in terms of procedural, not substantive, law. I do 
not think that these categorizations are appropriate for 
Glanvill, though, because he almost certainly was not 
thinking about it that way. His is an administrator’s 
mentality. The text itself is not all that different from the 
Dialogue of the Exchequer, a text on financial 
administration written around the same time.138  
  
 135. Hall, Introduction to GLANVILL, supra note 4, at xxii.  
 136. See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 107, at 166. 
 137. GLANVILL, supra note 4, at 26. 
 138. See MICHAEL CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD: ENGLAND 
1066-1307, at 18-19 (2d ed. 1993) (comparing Glanvill to the Dialogue as two 
manuals that attempted to describe administrative procedures in general ways). 
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III. TOWARD A SYSTEM OF PROPERTY: THE BRACTON TREATISE 
The Glanvill author seems to have had some sense that 
his law was part of the larger system of ius commune. The 
authors of Bracton show a much deeper commitment to this 
idea. Bracton, like Justinian’s Institutes, is divided into 
sections on persons, things, and actions.139 The author of the 
treatise’s first introduction, probably Henry de Bratton, 
calls it a summa, which was a genre of writing current in 
the Roman and canon law faculties in the universities.140 As 
I have argued elsewhere, the Bracton authors were much 
more heavily invested in Roman law because the ideology of 
medieval Roman law served their professional interests.141 
The author of Glanvill was writing in a period when the 
royal administration was not specialized, and when the 
people who worked in the royal courts might also be great 
magnates, work in the exchequer, or serve as clerks in the 
royal household.142 They were jacks of all trades who sat as 
justices part-time, as one among many roles they filled.143 
The Bracton authors were a new type of justice. They had 
served long apprenticeships as clerks to justices before 
being elevated to the bench themselves.144 William of Ralegh 
was Martin of Pattishall’s clerk for at least fifteen years 
when he became a justice of the common bench in 1229.145 
Henry de Bratton was William of Ralegh’s clerk before he 
  
 139. The authors divided the treatise this way even though the section on 
actions, which is the shortest of Justinian’s sections, fills almost the whole of the 
treatise. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 29 (“[T]he whole of the law with which we 
propose to deal relates either to persons or to things or to actions, according to 
English laws and customs.”); id. (beginning of section on persons); id. at 39 
(beginning of section on things); id. at 282 (beginning of section on actions, 
which runs for more than two volumes in the modern edition); J. INST.1.2.12 
(“All the law that we use, however, pertains either to persons, or to things, or to 
actions.”) (my translation) (“Omne autem ius, quo utimur, vel ad personas 
pertinent vel ad res vel ad actiones.”). 
 140. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 19. 
 141. Thomas J. McSweeney, English Justices and Roman Jurists: The Civilian 
Learning Behind England’s First Case Law, 84 TEMPLE L. REV. (forthcoming); 
McSweeney, supra note 6, at 4-5.  
 142. Id.  
 143. See TURNER, supra note 7, at 39. 
 144. Id.  
 145. See id. at 237. 
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became a justice.146 A great deal of a man like Henry de 
Bratton’s identity must have been bound up in the fact that 
he was a royal justice. Roman law was essentially a new 
technology that spoke to that identity. It provided the 
justices with a language for talking about the work they 
were doing as something superior to the other parts of the 
royal administration. They were jurists, servants of an 
impersonal law, priests of justice, as one of the Bracton 
authors put it, not the king’s accountants.147 For the author 
of Glanvill, Roman law was useful to the extent that it could 
provide him with a few technical terms; for the authors of 
Bracton, it provided them with an identity. 
The treatise is, as mentioned, divided on the model of 
Justinian’s sixth-century legal textbook, the Institutes, into 
sections on persons, things, and actions. Within these broad 
sections it is divided into tractates on specific subjects. The 
law of property is found in the same places in Bracton as it 
is in the Institutes, in the sections on things and actions. 
Within the law of things, Bracton contains a tractate on 
acquiring dominion over things, which mirrors a section of 
the Institutes.148 This contains many of the doctrines of 
occupation, capture, and gift that have become staples of 
the common law of property.149 Property also finds a 
prominent place in Bracton’s section on actions, which is 
divided into tractates on individual writs and procedural 
topics that cut across writs.150 The Institutes’s section on 
actions contains quite a bit of that text’s systematic 
discussion of property. It is even more prominent in 
Bracton’s section on actions, however, because all of the 
writs it discusses deal with landed wealth in one way or 
another.  
These tractates show us that the authors of Bracton 
clearly knew of the tradition of equating right with property 
and seisin with possession, but they show a discomfort with 
the straight equation between the Roman and Anglo-French 
  
 146. Id. at 216. 
 147. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 24. This passage is an allusion to a 
passage from Azo of Bologna’s Summa Codicis. AZO, supra note 12, at 1047. 
 148. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 42-281; J. INST. 2.7-.25. 
 149. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 42, 44, 47-48. 
 150. See id. at 282. 
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terms that the Glanvill author had used.151 The Bracton 
authors knew enough about Roman law and the practice of 
the English royal courts to see that this one-to-one equation 
would not work. Although writs that used the word seisin 
and writs that used the word right might be equivalent to 
Roman actions on the possession and the property to the 
limited extent that both systems used a double action, once 
the Bracton authors explored the substantive law of Roman 
possession and property more deeply, they found that 
reconciling the two systems would require a much more 
complex scheme. The Roman law the justices had learned 
dealt in absolute rights and abstract concepts. The 
procedures they administered in the courts dealt in concrete 
disputes between real people. In some cases the abstract 
theories of Roman law and the concrete practices of the 
English courts came to different conclusions. Both, however, 
had to be correct as far as the justices were concerned. They 
could not stray too far from the practices of the English 
courts, but Roman law was a universal law. The dilemma 
resembles the problems modern physicists have reconciling 
classical physics with quantum mechanics. The former 
works very well on the macro level; the latter works very 
well on the micro level. It has proved difficult to develop a 
unified theory that reconciles the two, however. The justices 
who wrote Bracton were trying to develop a unified theory 
of law. They maintained their investment in demonstrating 
equivalence between English and Roman law even as it 
must have become apparent to them that this would not 
work. In the process, they created several schemes for 
understanding landholding that fit possession and property 
together with seisin and right in increasingly contradictory 
and absurdly complex ways. We will now turn to three of 
those schemes. 
A.  The Causae of Possession 
In the tractate on acquiring dominion over things, a 
section of the treatise that was probably written primarily 
by William of Ralegh sometime before 1236, Ralegh 
discusses a gift made by someone who has no right in the 
thing he is giving (i.e., what happens when William gives 
  
 151. They refer to the assize of novel disseisin as a possessory interdict and 
distinguish it from a vindicatio, or writ of right, for instance. Id. at 294.  
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away land that actually belongs to Ranulf?).152 As part of 
this discussion, he presents us with our first scheme for 
thinking about the relationship between the Roman law of 
property and English court practice. Ralegh tells us that, “A 
thing may be entirely and in every way another’s, with 
respect to the right and the property, the fee and the free 
tenement, the usufruct and the bare use.”153 These six 
interests—right, property, fee, free tenement, usufruct, and 
bare use—add up to the greatest power one can have over a 
piece of land, since they make the land “entirely and in 
every way” (omnino et ex toto) the other person’s land.154 It is 
a curious list, drawn from all three languages of 
landholding. Right (ius in this instance) was a term in use 
in all three languages. It could have come to the author 
through the writ of right, through Roman law, or through 
the vernacular, as a translation of dreit. Property is clearly 
a Roman law term. Fee and free tenement were in use in the 
Anglo-Norman vocabulary of landholding; they often appear 
in charters. The fact that Ralegh places them side-by-side 
and makes such a clear distinction between the two 
indicates that he was probably thinking more specifically of 
their use in two different writs, the assize of mort d’ancestor 
and the assize of novel disseisin. Usufruct and bare use 
(nudum usus) are again terms drawn from Roman law 
texts. Ralegh is combining three different ways of speaking 
about the relationship between human beings and land into 
one set of interests.155 Somehow these six things connect a 
person to a piece of land, and when all are present, make it 
  
 152. There are several references to the statute of Merton of 1236 in this 
tractate, but they appear to be later additions to bring the text up to date. One 
is placed in the middle of a long excerpt from Glanvill and another between two 
sentences that appear to have been consecutive at one point, indicating that the 
main text was written before 1236 and needed to be updated. See id. at 179, 276; 
3 Thorne, supra note 8, at xiii.  
 153. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 101. 
 154.  Id. at 101. 
 155. This is not the only version of the list the authors give. See id. at 123 
(“the right and the property, the fee and the free tenement and seisin”); id. at 
127 (“[T]he [pure] right and the property, the fee and the free tenement and the 
usufruct.”). I have modified Thorne’s translation of “merum ius” from “mere 
right” to “pure right” because the meaning of the word mere has shifted since 
the thirteenth century from “pure” to “nothing more than.” 
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his “entirely and in every way.”156 But how do they connect 
the person to the land? What are these interests?  
Elsewhere in the tractate on acquiring dominion, 
Ralegh names them causae possidendi, “causes of (or 
reasons for) possession.” The terminology comes from the 
Digest.157 He tells us that if A makes a gift of a piece of land 
to B, A may change B’s causa possidendi without making a 
new grant 
as where, having first granted a usufruct for a term he may 
grant his tenant a free tenement, without livery [a ritual by 
which one person transferred seisin to another], by force of a 
new causa. If at first [it was] for a term of life and as a free 
tenement, he may change the causa to one in fee.
158
  
Ralegh imagines the landholder to have possession or seisin 
of the land itself. The causa is the interest that legitimates 
his possession of the land for a particular purpose. Once the 
donor has been put in physical possession, the causa of that 
possession can be changed without the ritual formalities 
that usually accompanied land transfers because the 
possession itself has not changed hands.159 The author does 
not treat the causae as abstract property rights that can 
themselves be possessed. He speaks of possession of the 
land under a causa, not possession of a causa.160  
The causae are separable from each other and, in fact, 
different people may hold the land by each of the causae at 
the same time, as 
one may have the right and the property and the fee in a free 
tenement and another the free tenement. One may have the 
fee and free tenement and another the [pure] right. One may 
have all these and another the usufruct. One may have all 




 156.  Id. at 101. 
 157. DIG. 41.2.3.19 (Paulus, Ad Edictum 54) (“Illud quoque a veteribus 
praeceptum est neminem sibi ipsum causam possessionis mutare posse.”). 
 158. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 140 (modification in the original).  
 159. See id. at 138.  
 160. See id. (“Two possessions of the same thing are not repugnant to one 
another provided they arise from different causae.”). 
 161. 3 Id. at 132; see also 2 id. at 102 (“A thing may be in small part one’s own 
and in greater part another’s, as where one has a free tenement in a thing and 
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They are, therefore, not just greater or lesser versions of the 
same right to the land. Each one must have distinguishing 
features so that the holder of a free tenement in a piece of 
land, for example, holds something different from the 
person who holds the fee in that same land. The authors of 
the Bracton treatise give us hints as to what each of these 
causae mean, and they define them largely in terms of 
duration.162 The bare use is difficult to untangle in the 
context of the treatise. The author of the lectures on the 
Institutes written in England around 1200 distinguished 
clearly between the bare use and the usufruct in terms of 
the rights to use and enjoy the land, but the authors of 
Bracton do not seem to have thought very deeply about the 
distinction between these two causae, often associating the 
two and even more often leaving the bare use off of the list 
altogether.163 One passage divides the usufruct from uses 
which are “called bare” in that the person who holds a 
usufruct holds it for a certain term, such as a term of years, 
while the holder of a bare use can be ejected at any time.164 
The distinguishing feature of the bare use is thus that it has 
no fixed duration.165 The owner can end it at any time. The 
distinguishing feature of the usufruct is the right to hold 
the land for a set term, a form of landholding that was 
common in England.166 Terms were used for land pledged to 
creditors. Likewise, holding land in wardship could be 
described as a term of years by thirteenth-century authors; 
  
another the property and the fee, as where a doweress is in possession, or 
another holding for life by gift, or by the law of England, or until provision be 
made for him and the like.”). 
 162. This division according to duration bears similarity to the later system of 
Common law estates, which also divide up the bundle of rights in land according 
to their duration, a similarity that I will develop further in Part IV. 
 163. See TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW, supra note 12, at 35. 
 164. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 102, 123. 
 165. The bare use seems to be similar to the modern tenancy at will or license.  
 166. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 101, 106, 140; 3 id. at 97, 161, 268, 273-
75. The authors sometimes follow Roman jurists in defining the usufruct as the 
right to use (usus) and enjoy the fruits (fructus) of the land, as the Roman law 
texts do. Id. at 138; see also id. at 92 (“Indeed the farmer can vindicate nothing 
except the usufruct, namely that which he can use freely and take the fruits 
from without impediment from the feoffor.”) (I have modified Thorne’s 
translation) (“[F]irmarius vero nihil sibi vindicare poterit nisi usumfructum, 
scilicet quod libere uti posset et sine impedimento feoffati percipere fructum.”).  
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when a tenant died with a minor heir, his lord was entitled 
to hold the land, as guardian, until the heir attained 
majority.167  
The authors define the free tenement as a longer causa 
than the usufruct: the free tenement is for life.168 There were 
several ways in which a person might hold for life. A widow 
was entitled to one-third of the lands her husband had held 
in demesne for the remainder of her life. A widower was 
entitled to hold any land his wife had during the marriage 
“for life . . . by the law of England” if a child had been born 
to the couple, an arrangement that was later called 
curtsey.169 Life holdings could also be used to manage the 
way land passed at a person’s death. We see many cases 
from the thirteenth century, often contested, where a 
landholder put someone else in seisin of his land, but 
reserved the land to himself for the rest of his life.170  
The word fee could have two meanings, both of which 
appear in Bracton. In a general sense, a fee could simply be 
a piece of land, and the authors of the treatise use it in this 
way at times.171 In a more specific sense, it was a piece of 
land that was heritable.172 In the lists of causae it is used in 
this more specific sense: the fee was greater than the free 
tenement because, like the later fee simple, it did not end 
  
 167. REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 368-69. 
 168. The authors do define it, as one might expect, in terms of freedom: we are 
told that it is called free to distinguish it from villein, or unfree, tenure, which is 
not protected by the king’s courts. See 3 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 171. 
 169. 4 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 360; BAKER, supra note 107, at 271.  
 170. See, e.g., British National Archives MS JUST 1/1182, m. 4, THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION, available at http://aalt.law.uh.edu/AALT3/JUST1/ 
JUST1no1182/aJUST1no1182fronts/IMG_0652.htm (last visited June 21, 2012) 
(recording the case of the manor of Dulverton, heard by Henry de Bratton, 
where Richard of Turbervill attempted to disinherit his brother by putting 
someone else in seisin while remaining in control of the land for life); see also 2 
BRACTON, supra note 5, at 107 (“If one [who] has both rights, property and 
possession, grants both to another, attaching this modus to his gift, that after a 
time the possession revert to him to be held for life . . . .”). 
 171. Hyams, supra note 28; see also 3 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 275 (“Fee is 
also used in another sense, from the point of view of one who enfeoffs another, 
what one holds of another, as where one says ‘such a one holds so many fees of 
me by knight service.’”). 
 172. Id. at 274 (a fee is “what one holds . . . to his heirs”). 
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with the death of the holder.173 The writs bear this out. The 
assize of mort d’ancestor gave an action to the nearest heir 
of the last person who had been “seised in . . . demesne as of 
fee.”174 Where the assize of novel disseisin, which was not 
concerned with heritability of land, used the words free 
tenement to describe the land, the assize of mort d’ancestor 
used the word fee. The authors draw the distinction between 
the heritable fee and the non-heritable free tenement 
throughout the treatise. For instance, the tractate on the 
assize of mort d’ancestor, which may bear the mark of both 
Ralegh and Bratton, tells us in another version of the 
causae that:  
one may be seised of land or a rent in his demesne as of fee 
and as of free tenement, or only as of fee and not in demesne, 
or only as of a free tenement, in demesne but not in fee, as 
may be said of those who hold only for life in whatever way.
175
 
In the first situation, where the landholder has both the fee 
and the free tenement, modern lawyers would say he has an 
estate that is presently possessory—i.e., he is presently in 
physical control—and also has the right to pass that estate 
to his heirs. In the second situation, where he has the fee, 
but not the free tenement, he has the right to pass his 
interest in the land to his heirs, but he does not have a 
presently possessory estate. Someone else has physical 
control of the estate for life. In the third, where he has the 
free tenement, but not the fee, he has present control of the 
land, but not the right to pass it to his heirs. Thus, the free 
tenement represents the presently possessory life estate, 
and the fee represents the heritable interest.  
  
 173. The authors never say, however, that the fee is unlimited in time, as 
modern property scholarship describes the fee simple. 
 174. 3 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 249. Again, it only applied to the nearest heir 
if that heir was a child, brother, sister, nephew, or niece. Id. 
 175. Id. at 275. There are a few cues that point to authorship after 1236 for 
this tractate. There is a limitation date that did not come into effect until 1237 
and a reference to the writ of cosinage, which William of Ralegh invented in the 
1230s. Id. at 249-50. This does not necessarily mean that Henry de Bratton 
wrote the tractate; William of Ralegh spent some time in exile between 1243 
and 1244, during a fight with the king over his election to an episcopal see, and 
this might have been an opportunity for him to work on the treatise. See 4 
MATTHEW PARIS, CHRONICA MAJORA 263-64, 285 (Henry Richards Luard ed., 
1872–1883). Generally speaking, though, the later a tractate was written, the 
more likely it is that the treatise had already been handed over to Bratton.  
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Ralegh is doing something rather extraordinary in the 
causae scheme. Where the Glanvill treatise used writs to 
create its organizational framework—sections of the 
treatise tend to focus on the procedures surrounding a 
particular writ—Ralegh is using words. Where the Glanvill 
author would focus on the assize of novel disseisin and the 
assize of mort d’ancestor, Ralegh is focusing his discussion 
on the meanings of the words fee and free tenement. So, for 
instance, where he could have said that the assize of novel 
disseisin was available to a doweress or a widower holding 
by curtsey, but not to a guardian or termor, Ralegh instead 
gives us the phrase free tenement, which is contained in the 
writ, and defines it as a life estate, which is what a 
doweress or widower holding by curtsey would have.176 To 
say that the free tenement is held for life is equivalent to 
saying that the assize applies only to estates held for life or 
longer. It is the fact that the author discusses these matters 
using abstract concepts rather than concrete writs that is 
really interesting. In place of a discussion about whether a 
particular type of plaintiff might bring a particular writ, the 
author presents us with a system of different causae of 
possession, based on duration. He is thinking like the 
authors of the Institutes, who place things prior to actions, 
concepts prior to the procedures that put them into practice. 
There is a real danger of oversystematizing the Bracton 
authors’ writing on the causae possidendi. The authors are 
inconsistent in the content of the list of causae itself, 
sometimes leaving out terms and sometimes replacing them 
with others. Many of the lists we find in the treatise leave 
out the bare use.177 Once we see the usufruct and the bare 
use replaced with seisin.178 In addition to the inconsistency 
we see in the terms themselves, there is a great deal of 
inconsistency in the ways the authors use them. The 
usufruct seems to have caused them no end of trouble, for 
instance, as they tried to make this Roman term fit their 
experience from English practice.179 And the authors are 
  
 176. SUTHERLAND, supra note 39, at 13. 
 177. See, e.g., 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 127. 
 178. See id. at 123. 
 179. In parts of the treatise, the authors say that the usufruct is for life. See 
id. at 101. This would, of course, gut the concept of the free tenement, making it 
indistinguishable from a usufruct. The authors are inconsistent in their 
treatment of the usufruct and the free tenement because Roman law conflicts 
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with the writ system of the English courts. At Roman law a usufruct could be for 
a term of years or for life. See Miller, supra note 88, at 66. English court practice 
distinguished between the termor, who could not bring an assize of novel 
disseisin, and a life tenant, who could.  
A passage in the tractate on exceptions, near the end of the treatise, presents 
the usufruct in a way that not only conflicts with Roman law, but also with the 
view of the usufruct presented in the causae scheme. The usufruct at Roman 
law was a right in rem that, as we have seen, included the rights to use the land 
and its fruits. See BERGER, supra note 87, at 755; Miller, supra note 88, at 42, 
65-66. It differed from full dominium, however, in that it was a personal 
servitude; the grant was personal to the grantee and he had no right to transfer 
(abusus) it to another during his life or at death. See Miller, supra note 88, at 
66-67. The Bracton authors were aware of the Roman doctrine that the usufruct 
was a servitude. They list it among servitudes in the beginning of the tractate 
on things, which borrows heavily from Justinian’s Institutes. See 2 BRACTON, 
supra note 5, at 39. In this passage in the tractate on exceptions, however, one 
of the Bracton authors takes an approach to the usufruct that in some ways 
accords with and in some ways conflicts with that of the Roman jurists. To this 
author, the usufruct is a chattel, which leaves the “tenement…unchanged in 
character as a lay fee.” 4 Id. at 268. The author was following the practice of the 
English courts, which treated a term of years as a chattel. In thirteenth-century 
England, the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over wills. This meant that 
the Church had a great deal of power over how one’s possessions passed at 
death. This power was not complete, however, because most land could not be 
passed by will and remained within the jurisdiction of the royal courts. The 
royal courts classed terms of years as chattels, subjecting them to the 
jurisdiction of the Church courts. This solution to an English problem accords 
with the Roman jurists’ conception of the usufruct in part. The Digest says that 
the usufruct is “not a part of ownership” (non dominii pars), a phrase which the 
Bracton authors actually quote in part of the treatise. This fits together well 
with the idea that the usufruct is a chattel and does not change the nature of 
the tenement. See 3 Id. at 162; DIG.50.16.25 (Paulus, Edict 21). But the author’s 
purpose in calling the usufruct a chattel—allowing the holder of the usufruct to 
pass it by will at death—runs precisely counter to the Roman conception of what 
a usufruct is. The usufructuary at Roman law had no right to alienate the 
usufruct, which was extinguished at his death and therefore could not pass by 
will. See Miller, supra note 88, at 67.  
In addition to conflicting with the Roman law of the usufruct, this passage 
conflicts with the causae of possession scheme. How could the usufruct be a 
chattel and a causa at the same time? The authors treat the causae as if they 
are reasons for possessing a thing, not things in and of themselves. This is a 
clear case where the authors’ attempt to systematize the practice of the English 
courts into an internally consistent law using Roman law as their model falls 
down. In order to make the usufruct accord with court practice, the authors 
needed to live with a certain degree of dissonance. The treatise was probably 
never fully edited by the original authors, though, and it is possible that they 
never noticed the dissonance. 
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least consistent when they discuss the right and the 
property. Where the terms usufruct, free tenement, and fee 
are fairly stable, appearing in most of the versions of the list 
we find in the treatise, the terms at the top of the list 
change regularly. In one version of the list, they become the 
“pure right  and the proprietas.”180 In another, they are 
called the “dominium and proprietas,” two Roman law 
terms that were synonyms, not separate interests, in 
mainstream interpretations of Roman law.181 Even stranger 
is the fact that dominium plays a different role immediately 
before this passage. On what would be the same folio in 
most manuscripts, the author, probably Ralegh here, tells 
us that the dominium of an estate is composed of “the pure 
right and the property, the fee and the free tenement and 
the usufruct.”182 In this list, property is a part of dominium. 
In the other, they are separate causae. In Roman law, they 
were synonyms.183  
Why did these higher interests cause so much trouble? 
The authors of the treatise seem to have been unsure what 
was left over when the term of years (usufruct), the life 
estate (free tenement), and the heritability (fee) were taken 
out and granted to another person. What can be longer than 
a heritable estate that lasts forever? Perhaps the lord’s 
right to take the estate by escheat when the landholder’s 
heirs run out. This should just be another fee, however, 
according to the authors’ classification. The authors define 
the causae in terms of time rather than enjoyment of the 
land. So when the fee and the free tenement are separated, 
as when a widow holds the land in dower for life, as a free 
  
 180. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 127 (my translation) (“merum ius et 
proprietatem”). 
 181. Id. at 128. 
 182. Id. at 127 (I have modified Thorne’s translation) (“merum ius et 
proprietatem, feodum et liberum tenementum, et usumfructum”). 
 183. Dominium could mean two things to an English justice with Roman law 
training. On the one hand, it could be a synonym for proprietas. On the other 
hand, it was the Latin translation for demesne, the land which the person at 
issue held and worked personally (or by unfree tenants, who did not count in the 
eyes of the law), rather than holding through a free tenant. Perhaps it means 
demesne here, since one who had held by all of these causae would, by definition, 
be working the land himself. One could hold in demesne without having the fee, 
the property, or the right, however. A woman holding in dower would hold only 
a free tenement, but could be said to hold in demesne. 
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tenement, and the previous holder’s heir holds the heritable 
estate, as a fee, the fee is not a possessory estate, but 
merely what modern property law would call a reversion. 
How do we differentiate the causae greater than the fee: the 
right, property, pure right, or dominium? The authors do 
not provide us with an answer. 
B.  The Two Rights 
Where the Glanvill author had treated right and 
property as synonyms, the authors of the causae of 
possession scheme in Bracton imagined them to be separate, 
if ill-defined, causae. Other parts of the treatise present us 
with a view of the relationship between right, property, and 
possession that contradicts both of these views, however. 
Near the beginning of the treatise, an author, probably 
Ralegh, presents us with two kinds of right: 
For there is a right of possession (ius possessionis) and a right 
of property (ius proprietatis): the right of possession, as of fee, 
where the assise of mort d’ancestor is applicable; and as of free 
tenement, as where one holds only for life, no matter in what 
way. The right of property is termed the pure right. Thus one 
may well have both. The right of property may sometimes be 
separated from the right of possession, for immediately after 
the death of his ancestor the property descends to the nearer 
heir, whether he is a minor or of full age, a male or a female, a 
madman or a fool, as an idiot, one who is deaf and dumb, 
present or absent, ignorant of the matter or apprised of it. 
Possession, however, is not at once acquired by such persons, 





 184. Id. at 24 (I have modified Thorne’s translation) (“Quia est ius proprietatis 
et ius possessionis. Item ius possessionis sicut feodum, et unde locum habet 
assisa mortis antecessoris. Item ius possessionis sicut liberum tenementum, si 
quis tenuerit tantum ad vitam quacumque ratione. Item ius proprietatis quod 
dicitur ius merum. Et unde poterit quis habere utrumque. Et dividi poterit 
quandoque ius proprietatis a iure possessionis. Quia proprietas statim post 
mortem antecessoris descendit heredi propinquiori, minori et maiori, masculo et 
feminæ, furioso et stulto sicut fatuo, surdo et muto, præsenti et absenti, et 
ignoranti sicut scienti. Sed tamen non statim adquiritur talibus possessio, licet 
possessio et ius possessionis semper sequi debeat proprietatem.”). Thorne calls 
these two rights possessory right and proprietary right, but in the Latin, 
possessionis and proprietatis are genitive nouns, not adjectives. This passage is 
found in a section of the treatise most likely written by Ralegh. It appears in an 
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In this passage, Ralegh bifurcates the concept of right 
into a right of possession and a right of property. In doing 
so, he follows the earlier treatises to an extent. Like 
Glanvill, he uses the binary of pleas of possession and pleas 
of property, and places the assizes of novel disseisin and 
mort d’ancestor on the side of possession. Unlike Glanvill, 
he does not equate possession with seisin and property with 
right. In this scheme, both writs of possession and writs of 
property implicate right.185 Ralegh may not follow Glanvill, 
but he follows the Roman law of possession and property 
very closely. The right of property descends automatically to 
the heir at death because taking property requires no act or 
intention. The right of possession, however, does not pass 
automatically because, at Roman law, one had to take 
possession both corpore and animo, by body and by mind. 
Ralegh lists several classes of people who would be unable 
to take possession animo because they lacked the mental 
capacity to do so. Ralegh is making another valiant effort to 
work the writs he administered in the courts into the frame 
of Roman property law.  
This scheme of the two rights conflicts with the causae 
scheme in some significant respects, however. If we look at 
the list that gives the causae as “the right and the property, 
  
addicio, one of the later additions to the text, which could indicate that Bratton, 
not Ralegh, wrote it. Even if these words were written by Bratton, however, the 
idea of separating right into a right of possession and a right of property must 
have come from Ralegh originally, since it appears throughout the treatise, and 
in parts that Ralegh is almost certain to have written. A notable example occurs 
in the tractate on acquiring dominion over things, very close to two passages 
that are updated to reflect the statute of Merton of 1236, indicating that the 
primary text was written before that date. See id. at 189. 
 185. It is, of course, possible that Ralegh is using the word right (ius) in a 
different sense here than the the Glanvill author does. Ius was a word that 
could have many meanings. The Glanvill author imported the term from the 
grand assize, which asked who had the “greater right” (maius ius). Glanvill used 
the word to mean that which is decided by the writ of right, a concept which 
could also be expressed by the word rectum. But ius was also used in a general 
way in Roman law texts to mean any right. In the causae of possession scheme 
and in the “quantum of right” scheme, which we will examine next, Bratton and 
Ralegh appear to use the word ius in the same way the writ of right and the 
Glanvill author used it. Shortly after the section quoted above, Ralegh tells us 
that when the right of property is split, one person will have the “greater right” 
(maius ius), language drawn directly from the grand assize, indicating that he 
was thinking about the grand assize when he wrote the text that contains the 
two rights scheme. See id. at 25. 
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the fee and the free tenement, the usufruct and the bare 
use” we can see that it does not sit neatly with a bifurcated 
scheme that separates right into a right of possession and a 
right of property.186 In the causae, right and property are 
often listed as two separate causae, two separate reasons for 
possessing the land. Possession is what the landholder has, 
and right or property is his reason for having it, a reason 
which also determines the temporal scope of the 
landholding (whether it is hereditary, for life, for a term, 
etc.). In the causae scheme, right and property are 
comparable terms, both causae. Possession is not a causa 
and is not comparable to these two other terms. In the 
scheme of the two rights, it is possession and property that 
are the comparable terms. They are two attributes a right 
may have. So the words right, possession, and property play 




The two schemes also differ greatly in their treatment 
of the substantive law of possession. In the causae 
possidendi, possession is a fact. The list of causae is a list of 
underlying interests that make that possession legitimate. 
They are abstract rights in the land that allow that land to 
be possessed in a certain way. In the bifurcated right 
scheme, the word possession is doing very different work. I 
discussed earlier possession’s tendency to become an 
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abstract right.187 That is what has happened here. It has 
become a right of possession, a lesser right than the right of 
property. Gone is the Digest’s insistence, repeated elsewhere 
in the Bracton treatise, that possession and property have 
nothing in common.188 Here they exist on the same 
continuum. 
C. A Quantum of Right 
In the two-rights scheme, Ralegh associated the writ of 
right, the assize of mort d’ancestor, and the assize of novel 
disseisin with the concept of right, despite the fact that 
Glanvill associated only the writ of right with right and 
associated the two lower writs, mort d’ancestor and novel 
disseisin, with seisin.189 The idea that right exists even in 
some of the writs at the lower end of the scale is central to 
the third scheme we will examine, the “quantum of right” 
scheme. In the tractate on acquiring dominion over things, 
very close to several of the accounts of the causae possidendi 
we have already seen, one of the authors, probably Ralegh 
again, presents us with the following scheme: 
[1] There is possession which has nothing of right but 
something of possession, as where one is in possession by 
intrusion. [2] There is another kind that has something of 
possession but nothing of right, as where one is in possession 
as guardian or creditor and the like. [3] There is another that 
has much of possession [but] little of right, as the possession of 
an ancestor, [recovered] in a possessory action, where another 
has the pure right and the ancestor the fee and free tenement. 
[4] And another that has a great deal of possession and 
something of right, where it is changed into a proprietary 
causa, as where one holds for a term of life or years. [5] There 
is also possession that has much of possession and much of 
right, as where in some thing one has the pure right and the 




 187. See supra Part I.C.  
 188. See, e.g., 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 321; 3 id. at 325. 
 189. See supra Part II.  
 190. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 122-23. I have modified the translation 
slightly from Thorne’s. For situation 3, Thorne has a “good deal of 
possession” but the Latin is “multum . . . possessionis,” the same phrase he 
translates as “much of possession” for situation 5. There is a second version 
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Ralegh places various types of land arrangements on a 
continuum based on how much possession and how much 
right each one contains. Right increases fairly steadily from 
1 to 5. Possession generally increases as right increases, but 
this is not universally so. Situations 1 and 2 have something 
of possession, 3 has much of possession, 4 has a great deal of 
possession, and 5 reverts to much of possession. So, 
possession and right appear to be independent of each 
other.  
In one way, this list fits with the causae of possession 
very well. Apart from number 5, these are marginal cases, 
where the holder of the land holds by one causa, but not by 
another. In number 3, for instance, Ralegh has imagined a 
case where the possessor holds by fee, but not by right. 
Ralegh is thus finding ways to separate and distinguish 
categories of landholding. In other ways, however, the 
quantum of right conflicts directly with the causae and the 
two-rights schemes. In the causae of possession, right and 
property were comparable terms, of the same order. In the 
two-rights scheme, possession and property were 
comparable. In the quantum of right scheme, possession 
and right are the comparable terms. The author is taking 
the Roman binary between possession and property, which 
the author of Glanvill applied to the Anglo-French terms 
seisin and right, and hybridizing it into a binary between 
possession and right. This was not altogether new. The 
author of the Très Ancien Coutumier de Normandie, written 
in parts over the course of the thirteenth century, had used 
the same distinction, as had William of Ralegh in a 1231 
case recorded on his roll.191 David Seipp has shown that the 
possession-right dichotomy was also used in the law reports 
of the late thirteenth century to describe writs.192  
  
of the quantum of right scheme in the treatise, in the introduction to the 
section of the treatise on civil actions. This version has six tiers. 3 Id. at 13.  
 191. See 1 COUTUMIERS DE NORMANDIE 23, 279-80 (Ernest-Joseph Tardif ed., 
1881–1896); 2 BRACTON’S NOTE BOOK 437 (F.W. Maitland ed., 1887) (“[T]o be 
lord and heir pertains to right and not to possession . . . .”) (my translation) 
(“[E]sse dominum et heredem spectat ad ius et non ad possessionem . . . .”).  
 192. Seipp has shown that in the year books, the possession-right dichotomy 
was used in two, inconsistent, ways. See Seipp, supra note 131, at 9-26. First, it 
was used to create two, entirely separate categories of writs. Id. All writs of 
possession had something in common with each other, and all writs of right had 
something in common with each other, but never the twain shall meet. Id. at 22. 
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The author’s patterns of thought about this binary are 
primarily Anglo-French. Possession and property, in 
conventional interpretations of Roman law circulating in 
Northern Europe, did not come in amounts. One could not 
have greater property than another.193 One could have 
greater right, however: the jurors in a grand assize were 
asked precisely who has the “greater right” in a piece of 
land.194 Although it would describe Roman law actions 
poorly, the quantum of right scheme actually describes 
English writs rather well because it does not require a 
binary classification. A writ like mort d’ancestor, which is 
higher in the hierarchy of writs than the novel disseisin, but 
lower than the writ of right, can be both a writ of possession 
and a writ of right. Situation three describes an assize of 
mort d’ancestor, or another writ of the mort d’ancestor 
family, which has “much of possession” and also a “little of 
right.”195 So the assize of mort d’ancestor is primarily 
possessory, but also has some of the aspects of an action on 
right or property. 
The quantum of right scheme causes at least as many 
problems as it solves, however. Situation 4, where the 
possessory causa turns into a proprietary one, shows some 
  
Second, it was used to describe writs in a relational way. Id. at 25. By Glanvill’s 
time, the courts had established a rule that there was a hierarchy of writs and, 
if one sued on a higher writ, he was barred from bring the same case on any writ 
beneath it in the hierarchy. Id. One could, however, bring his suit on a lower 
writ, lose, and bring the case again on a higher writ. Id. When faced with issues 
of whether the plaintiff was precluded from bringing his case, the lawyers of the 
late thirteenth century would use the possession-right binary, but in a relative 
way. Id. Thus, the lower writ was always denominated a writ of possession and 
the higher a writ of right. Id. Thus, when a person had sued on a writ of entry 
and later sued on a writ of right, the writ of right would be unsurprisingly, 
denominated a writ on the right and the writ of entry a writ on the possession, 
because it is lower. Id. at 25-26. But if the plaintiff had sued on a writ of mort 
d’ancestor and later wanted to sue on a writ of entry, the writ of entry would be 
denominated a writ on the right, because, of the two writs, it is the higher in the 
hierarchy. Id. Whether a writ was on the possession or the right was thus 
situational, based on the writ it was being compared to. Id. at 26. 
 193.  Miller, supra note 88, at 45 (“[O]wnership is a distinct paramount right 
rather than a mere label attaching to the most compelling of two or more 
competing claims to a thing.”). 
 194. See EARLY REGISTERS, supra note 38, at 6. 
 195. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 122 (I have modified Thorne’s 
translation) (“Est et alia quæ multum habet possessionis et parum iuris . . . .”). 
2012] PROPERTY BEFORE PROPERTY 1187 
of the contradictions inherent in Ralegh’s thinking.196 
Ralegh is thinking about possession in two different ways: 
he uses the possession/right distinction of the quantum of 
right scheme, but also the possession/property distinction of 
the two rights scheme. So, in this situation, the plaintiff’s 
causa, here probably meaning a cause of action, “is changed 
to a proprietary causa.”197 This appears to be the two-rights 
scheme. The plaintiff’s cause of action, or his writ, has 
crossed the line from a possessory writ to a proprietary writ. 
He clearly thinks that one may have more or less of 
possession and right when thinking in terms of the 
quantum of right scheme, since he says this person has a 
great deal of possession and something of right. In the two-
rights scheme, there are no amounts of possession and 
property. An action is either possessory or proprietary. And 
yet an action that has crossed the line from possession to 
property still has “a great deal of possession” and, strangely, 
only “something of right.”198  
Indeed, in this passage, Ralegh combines all three of the 
schemes. In situation 5, which is greatest of the five in right 
and property, he combines the quantum of right scheme 
with the causae possidendi scheme.199 A person in this 
situation holds the land under all of the causae possidendi 
except, perhaps, the usufruct and bare use: “the [pure] right 
and the property, the fee and the free tenement with 
seisin.”200 This sounds like absolute ownership, since the 
person has pure right and property in the land, but even 
this is only said to have “much of” right and “much of” 
possession.201 The author, in combining these schemes, uses 
the word right in two different ways. It is part of his hybrid 
binary of possession and right, but it is also a causa 
possidendi. One who has the purest right one can have has 
“much right” in the land. In the causae possidendi scheme, 
right is something one has or does not and, in this case, 
represents the highest and purest type of interest one can 
have in land. In the two-rights scheme, right is bifurcated, 
  
 196. Id. at 123. 
 197. Id. (I have modified Thorne’s translation) (“vertitur causa proprietatis”). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 122-23.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
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but it is still something one has or does not. In the quantum 
of right scheme, it is something one can have more or less 
of.  
IV. UNTANGLING THE THREE LANGUAGES 
A.  An Absolute Right? 
The problem the authors had in all three schemes with 
right, pure right, property, and dominium stems from a 
fundamental difference between English and Roman ways 
of thinking about the relationship between people and land. 
The authors clearly knew that Roman property was an 
absolute concept, an in rem right good against the world. In 
theory, they could imagine something like that. There was 
an absolute right to land that only God could judge. They 
use terms in the treatise that suggest that they wanted 
their law to have such a pure and absolute right to land. 
The language of pure right and the idea that all of the 
causae together add up to dominium both suggest an 
absolute right, as does the concept of the “true owner” or 
“true lord” (verus dominus), which appears in practically 
every tractate of the treatise.202 We even see a double right, 
when the right of possession and the right of property are 
combined, which the authors call dreit dreit (literally, “right 
right”), which appears to be a Bractonian invention, absent 
from the English court lexicon before the treatise.203  
Even if they could imagine a pure, absolute right in rem 
in their vernacular discussions of right and in the Roman 
law of property, the theory that no human could judge this 
absolute right admitted no such possibility. In human 
courts, all rights were relative. The grand assize could only 
ever decide who had the “greater right.” Thus, we end up 
with a confused set of schemes that try to speak to both 
right’s relative nature and property’s absolute and final 
nature.204 They all seem to contain some sort of vague notion 
that property and right are equivalent. The result is that 
  
 202. See id. at 84, 86, 123, 127, 155, 157, 174, 230, 240-41; 3 id. at 23, 24, 27, 
33, 51, 70, 84, 89, 91, 97, 128, 133-36. 
 203. 3 Id. at 325.  
 204. As Seipp observed, the two rights theory used “a Roman vocabulary to 
approximate an English notion of ‘relative’ ownership.” Seipp, supra note 131, at 
13. 
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each takes on the attributes of the other. Property becomes 
relative and right becomes absolute. Immediately following 
the discussion of the two rights scheme we have examined, 
for instance, Ralegh tells us that “[t]he right of property can 
sometimes be separated from the right of possession.”205 
This leads Ralegh to give an example where the two rights 
are held by different people and actually descend to 
different people. A father dies leaving two sons.206 The 
younger son puts himself in seisin upon his father’s death, 
in violation of his elder brother’s right, and then dies seised 
of the land.207 Upon his death, the possessory right will 
actually descend to the son of this younger son, as his 
nearest heir.208 Oddly enough, according to Ralegh, the 
younger son’s son also inherits “a certain right of property 
which should follow the principal property.”209 
Two people have the same right of property in the same 
land. This was impossible in Roman law.210 How could 
Ralegh resolve this? Echoing the words of the writ of right, 
Ralegh answers this question for the case of the two 
brothers: “The heirs of the first brother have a greater right 
than those of the second.”211 One right of property is a better 
right of property than the other. It would seem that Henry 
de Bratton seconded this relative view of right and 
property.212 Just as Ralegh imagines the two-rights scheme 
  
 205. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 24 (I have modified Thorne’s translation) (“Et 
dividi poterit quandoque ius proprietatis a iure possessionis.”). 
 206. Id. at 24-25. 
 207. Id. 
  208.  Id. 
 209. Id. at 25 (I have modified Thorne’s translation) (“quoddam ius 
proprietatis . . . quod sequi deberet primam proprietatem”). 
 210. See DIG. 13.6.5.15 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 28) (stating that two people 
cannot have dominium in the same thing in solidum); Thomas Rüfner, The 
Roman Concept of Ownership and the Medieval Concept of Dominium Utile, in 
THE CREATION OF THE IUS COMMUNE: FROM CASUS TO REGULA 131, 136 (John W. 
Cairns & Paul J. Du Plessis eds., 2010) (demonstrating that the rule against 
multiple ownership was adopted from Roman law into medieval canon law and 
caused some difficulty for medieval jurists trying to explain how it could fit with 
notions of lordship). 
 211. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 25. 
 212. The following discussion appears in the introduction to the section on civil 
actions. 3 Id. at 13. I suspect Bratton wrote this introduction rather than Ralegh 
because it contains a reference to William of Drogheda’s Summa Aurea, which 
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as relative, Bratton imagines the quantum of possession 
scheme as relative. He runs through a list of six different 
types of interests one may have, according to the amount of 
possession and the amount of right that each one contains, 
and then tells us, “But though he has a maximum of 
possession and of right, nevertheless another may have a 
greater right in the same thing.”213 Finally, Ralegh imagines 
the causae possidendi scheme, the most absolute of all the 
schemes, as relative. According to a passage in the tractate 
on acquiring dominion, “[o]ne may have the [pure] right and 
the property, the fee and the free tenement [acquired] 
through some justa causa of acquisition and rightful title, 
and another have all these and the greater right, because of 
priority in time.”214 Once again, the writ of right’s “greater 
right” makes it impossible for anyone to have a right that is 
good against all comers. In none of the three schemes is 
there a point where someone has an absolute right good 
against the world. 
Roman law could simply not be made to fit with the 
language the authors found in their writs. Roman law had 
actions on the possession and actions on the property. It had 
an in rem property right, which decided ownership against 
all the world. The writ of right only decided who, among two 
people, had the greater right. Writs, documents that set 
procedures into motion, could not be easily reduced to the 
abstract concepts that characterized Roman law. The 
processes of the royal courts, defined by writs, were thus not 
susceptible to an easy systematization on the Roman model. 
B.  Time 
The idea of relativity of right came to the authors both 
from the vernacular and from the writs that followed the 
  
was probably not in circulation until 1239. See Richardson, supra note 71, at 23-
26. This does not mean that this passage was not written by Ralegh, who might 
have still been working on the treatise in the 1240s, but it makes it more likely 
that the treatise had passed into Bratton’s hands by the time this passage was 
written. 
 213. 3 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 13. 
 214. 2 Id. at 103 (I have modified Thorne’s translation) (“Item poterit quis 
habere ius merum et proprietatem, feodum et liberum tenementum, ex aliqua 
iusta causa adquisitionis et ex iusto titulo, et alius haec omnia, sed maius ius 
propter temporis prioritatem.”). 
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vernacular understanding of right. The second un-Roman 
aspect that we see in the treatise appears to have come from 
outside of the writ system altogether and thus to represent 
one way that the authors’ vernacular understandings of 
landholding influenced the ways they thought about writs 
and Roman law. The authors of Bracton were obsessed with 
time. They took easily to the Roman law of prescription and 
usucapion and molded it to fit their own sense that right 
became stronger with time. 
Maitland famously said in his chapter on ownership and 
possession in The History of English Law Before the Time of 
Edward I that the “most salient trait of our English land 
law” is that “[p]roprietary rights in land are . . . projected 
upon the plane of time. The category of quantity, of 
duration, is applied to them.”215 Maitland’s pithy 
formulation of the estates in land has become a staple of the 
American first-year property curriculum.216 Maitland’s 
heavy reliance on Bracton for the legal doctrine of the 
thirteenth century is well known. Indeed, it might be more 
accurate to call the book The History of English Law Before 
the Time of Edward I According to Bracton. Even though he 
recognizes that there was, as yet, no doctrine of estates in 
land, he treats Bracton’s obsession with time and duration 
as a sort of system of estates in the making, and also 
assumes that Bracton is representative of thirteenth-
century law.217  
The Bracton authors’ obsession with time should have 
raised red flags for Maitland, however. Bracton’s 
discussions of time diverge from and go far beyond those 
found in Roman law, to the extent that it seems unlikely 
that Roman influence was the driving force behind them. 
They also fit very poorly with the dominant historical model 
of English landholding at Maitland’s time: feudalism. The 
history of landholding before the introduction of Henry II’s 
procedural reforms has largely been written as a story of 
feudal relations. Under the feudal model, lordship is 
considered to be the nexus between people and land and 
landholding is defined by the relationship between lord and 
vassal. The lord was the true landowner and bought service 
  
 215. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 107, at 10. 
 216. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 192 (7th ed. 2010). 
 217. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 107, at 10-12. 
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with that land through the ceremonies of homage and 
fealty, after which the vassal became the lord’s man 
(homme, hence homage), received land, and, in exchange, 
owed the lord service, often as a knight. The relationship 
through which people acquired access to land was thus a 
personal bond between two people and, according to this 
model, the vassal’s access to land lasted exactly as long as 
that personal bond. Most scholars have seen the vassal in 
the pre-legalized, feudal world as, at most, a holder for 
life.218 He might expect that his eldest son would succeed to 
his lands at his death, but his son had nothing like a legally 
enforceable inheritance right. In fact, S.F.C. Milsom has 
argued that the vassal had no right in the land at all, only 
an affective relationship with his lord, one result of which 
was temporary access to a piece of land.219  
Since the 1970s, many scholars have broken away from 
this feudal model of landholding.220 Susan Reynolds and 
John Hudson have argued persuasively that a person’s right 
to hold his land in the early middle ages had very little to do 
with his lord.221 Hudson analyzes charters recording land 
transfers by vassals. He concludes that, in cases of 
perpetual transfers by subinfeudation, even when the lord’s 
permission was sought and included in the charter, there is 
no evidence that “the lord was seen at the time as the real 
or even the co-donor.”222 The vassal did not imagine himself 
as having a life estate or a mere affective relationship with 
his lord. He imagined that his land belonged to his family in 
perpetuity and could be alienated without the lord’s 
permission, subject to “a norm, the strength of which varied 
  
 218. See, e.g., S.F.C. MILSOM, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 
120-21 (1976); Samuel E. Thorne, English Feudalism and Estates in Land, 17 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 193, 205, 208-29 (1959). 
 219. See MILSOM, supra note 218, at 120-21. 
 220. See, e.g., HUDSON, supra note 26 at 205-07; REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 
388; STEPHEN D. WHITE, CUSTOM, KINSHIP, AND GIFTS TO SAINTS: THE LAUDATIO 
PARENTUM IN WESTERN FRANCE, 1050-1150, at 1-7 (1988); Elizabeth A.R. Brown, 
The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe, 79 
AM. HIST. REV. 1063, 1063-67 (1974); Paul Hyams, Homage and Feudalism: A 
Judicious Separation, in DIE GEGENWART DES FEUDALISMUS 14, 14-48 (Natalie 
Fryde et al. eds., 2002). 
 221. HUDSON, supra note 26, at 205-07; REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 388.  
 222. HUDSON, supra note 26, at 213. 
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with circumstances,” that the lord should be consulted.223 
The most important of those circumstances was the length 
of time the vassal’s family had been seised of the land. 
Vassals felt freer to alienate, without the lord’s permission, 
land they had inherited than land that had come as a direct 
grant from that lord.224 Bracton bears this out. While the 
treatise does mention lordship in other contexts, it plays 
almost no role at all in the treatise’s discussions of one’s 
right to hold land.225 The language of lordship does not 
impinge on the discussions of Roman property law or force 
the authors to twist Roman law to accord with it.  
Bracton suggests, as Hudson’s charters do, that the 
actual nexus between people and land was not lordship, but 
time. Time was what allowed a person, or more often a 
lineage, to place its stamp of right upon the land. According 
to one author, “[s]ome possessions are short and tenuous, 
others long and fortified by time.”226 Roman law did have a 
doctrine, or several doctrines, of time. Under the law of 
prescription and usucapion, a person who had no property 
right in a thing could establish one through long possession. 
This is another area where the authors of the treatise 
twisted the Roman law they found in their sources to suit 
their needs. The authors of the treatise, both Ralegh and 
Bracton, quote the sections of Azo’s Summa Codicis that 
discuss usucapion and prescription, so we know that they 
drew some of their Roman doctrine from that source.227 But 
where Azo discusses usucapion, prescription after ten to 
twenty years, and prescription after thirty to forty years as 
three different categories of prescription, all of which 
require different legal analyses, the Bracton authors elide 
the three and use prescription, usucapion, and possession 
  
 223. Id. at 215. 
 224. Vassals were more likely to record their heirs’ permission in charters 
alienating inherited land and their lord’s permission in charters alienating land 
acquired by direct grant from the lord. See id. at 209. 
 225. When the Bracton authors discuss the dominus, they almost always use 
the word in the Roman sense of owner rather than the medieval sense of lord. 
See, e.g., 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 174 (using the phrase dominus verus to 
mean the true owner, who has the capacity to make a gift). 
 226. Id. at 123 (“Item possessionum quaedam brevis et tenera, et quaedam 
longa et tempore firmata.”). 
 227. See id. at 121. 
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for a long time as synonyms.228 The authors’ emphasis on 
the Roman law of prescription and usucapion goes far 
beyond the treatment it receives in the authors’ Roman law 
sources.229 It permeates every tractate. The authors of 
Bracton speak of acquiring right, property, or a free 
tenement through “long and peaceful possession” or “long 
and peaceful seisin,” phrases undoubtedly modified from 
Justinian’s “long and unchallenged possession,” no less than 
fourteen times in the treatise.230 As time passes, the fact 
that someone is holding land matures and strengthens into 
a right to hold that land; an “is” becomes an “ought.” “Long 
and peaceful” landholding will mature into a right to 
remain on the land, no matter how it was acquired.231 
The issues of relativity that we saw in the causae 
possidendi scheme also implicate time. Even the highest of 
the causae, those ones that the Bracton authors try to 
imagine as absolute in the Roman sense, are subject to the 
rule of priority in time. As we saw in one list of the causae, 
“One may have the [pure] right and the property, the fee 
and the free tenement [acquired] through some justa causa 
of acquisition and rightful title, and another have all these 
and the greater right, because of priority in time.”232 The one 
who is prior in time, who has held longest or whose family 
has held longest, wins.  
Time is also the way the authors divide the various 
interests people may have in the same land. The causae 
possidendi describe not different ways of cutting up the use 
rights to a piece of land, but different ways of dividing it 
temporally: the usufruct is for a term, the free tenement is 
for life, and the fee continues beyond the life of the current 
holder. The authors have to twist Roman law here. The 
usufruct was not defined in terms of time in Roman law. It 
  
 228. AZO, supra note 12, at 731-51; 2 BRACTON, supra note 5 at 126, 156. 
 229. See AZO, supra note 12, at 731-39; J. INST. 2.6; TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW, 
supra note 12, at 37 . 
 230. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 102, 123, 126, 127, 142, 150; 3 id. at 247, 248, 
320; J. INST. 2.6.7. 
 231. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5 at 123, 126, 127, 142, 150; 3 id. at 247, 248, 320.  
 232. 2 id. at 103 (second alteration in original) (I have substituted “pure right” 
for Thorne’s “mere right”) (“Item poterit quis habere ius merum et proprietatem, 
feodum et liberum tenementum, ex aliqua iusta causa adquisitionis et ex iusto 
titulo, et alius haex omnia, sed maius ius propter temporis prioritatem.”). 
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was defined principally as the combination of two use 
rights, the right to use the thing and the right to enjoy its 
fruits.233 At Roman law, its duration was a matter for its 
creator. He could create a usufruct to last either for a term 
or for the usufructuary’s life.234 For Bracton, the fact that it 
is for life is what defines the usufruct; use rights are not a 
natural way to divide up the land for the authors. The 
highest of the causae, the right, property, pure right, or 
dominium depending on the list, are, oddly enough, the 
most attenuated from any right to actually use the land. If 
each of the causae in a piece of land is really possessed by a 
different person, it is the lowest on the list who has present 
control and the right to use it, the people above him having 
what we would think of as future interests that take effect 
when his causa ends. The person with the highest interests, 
the interests called “pure” and “proprietary,” have some sort 
of interest that is beyond the fee, beyond the right to 
inherit. These causae, which the author speaks of in the 
most absolute terms available to him, are defined as 
possessions fortified by the greatest amount of time and 
continuing for the greatest time in the future. They entail 
no present use rights, however.  
This focus on time could potentially be explained by the 
writs that the Bracton authors, themselves judges, worked 
with in the royal courts. Writs contained limitation dates 
that precluded litigants from bringing cases that were too 
old. A writ of novel disseisin began, “[t]he king to the 
sheriff, greeting. A. de N. has complained to us that B., 
unjustly and without judgment, has disseised him of his 
free tenement in N. after our last crossing from Ireland to 
England.”235 The king changed the limitation dates from 
time to time. The return of King John from Ireland to which 
the writ refers took place in 1210, and this limitation date 
came into force in 1218, meaning that, at the time, 
disseisins committed eight years ago or longer were no 
longer actionable by an assize of novel disseisin.236 A justice 
could think of this in terms of A’s free tenement being 
extinguished and B’s very weak claim maturing into a free 
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 234. Id. at 66-67. 
 235. EARLY REGISTERS, supra note 38, at 1. 
 236. Id. at xxxv-xxxvi. 
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tenement, although A still had the right in the land and 
could bring a writ of right. One contemporary Norman 
author did in fact read limitation dates this way.237 The fact 
that the limitation periods were longer for the assize of mort 
d’ancestor and even longer for the writ of right could lead 
one to the conclusion that those interests, the fee and the 
right, required more time to mature.238 But this reading of 
the limitation dates, where A’s right is extinguished and B’s 
matures, is not the Bracton authors’ reading. The authors of 
Bracton never present limitation dates as if they extinguish 
A’s right. One author, possibly Bratton, tells us that the 
writ of right “is limited in time” and “does not go back of the 
time of King Henry the grandfather of the lord king [i.e., 
before 1154],” but this most emphatically does not mean 
that a person who lost his land before 1154 has no right:239  
The reason is because beyond that time one cannot prove 
anything, though he has a right in the thing, since no one can 
prove anything back of that time, since he cannot speak of his 
own sight, or of the sight of a father who enjoined his son to be 
a witness if he should hear it disputed.
 
Hence if one should 
speak of the time of King Henry the elder he could lose because 




 237. The author of the Norman text called the Summa de Legibus in Curia 
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Right is never extinguished. One may lose the means to 
recover it because he cannot prove his right to the 
satisfaction of the court, but the person whose family was 
ejected from the land before the limitation date still has the 
greater right than the person whose family ejected him. 
Likewise, while B can no longer be sued by A by a writ of 
right once the limitation date has changed, he does not 
actually acquire anything new. If C, who had no claim to the 
land against A or B, had ejected B at any point while B held 
the land, B could have sued him on a writ of right and won 
because B still had the greater right. B had a right that was 
protected by the writ of right the moment he ejected A from 
the land.  
The fact that the Bracton authors read time into so 
many aspects of landholding in so many different ways 
leads me to believe that they were not extrapolating the 
element of time from the writs, but were rather reading the 
writs through the lens of a landholding culture that already 
saw time as the most important element in establishing 
right. We can see this in one passage on the writ of right, 
which comes immediately before the discussion of limitation 
dates above; the writ itself does not implicate time, but 
Bratton reads it as if it does. To Bratton, the reason why the 
plaintiff in a writ of right must produce a witness who can 
testify that the plaintiff’s ancestor took esplees from the 
land—essentially meaning that he took some part of its 
produce—is that it shows that the ancestor was on the land 
for at least the minimal amount of time needed to take the 
esplees, and therefore had more than a momentary seisin.241 
It is highly unlikely that this was the actual reason for the 
rule that esplees must be mentioned in a writ of right. 
Rather, taking esplees is a way of making one’s claim to the 
land visible. It shows that the claimant’s ancestor was on 
the land as the landholder and not merely as a visitor or 
intruder.242 But the author of this passage reads it as a 
requirement about time.  
Thus, there is no sense in the treatise that limitation 
dates were the impetus for the authors to think about right 
becoming stronger over time. Nor could the Roman law of 
prescription be the impetus, because the authors had no 
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sense that titles could be extinguished as the Roman jurists 
did. This, rather, seems to be the authors’ own background 
coming into their writing. They are reading their texts in 
light of an Anglo-French land culture that focused on time.  
CONCLUSION 
Property talk is so ingrained in both legal and lay 
discourse that it is easy to imagine that property is a 
neutral language that can be used to describe any 
relationship between people and things. The fact that 
property and possession are common to both common law 
and civil law probably does not hurt this assessment. We 
have seen, however, that the Bracton authors, part of the 
first generation of English justices to learn to speak the 
language of property, had a very difficult time conforming it 
to their own languages of the relationship between people 
and land. They had to twist contemporary understandings 
of Roman law in the attempt to reconcile it to the practices 
of the English courts and the understandings of the 
Francophone Anglo-Norman landed elite, which existed 
alongside each other as related and competing notions of the 
way people related to land. The result was not pretty. 
Bracton’s discussion of property law is muddled and 
contradictory. It is the first time, however, that someone 
thought to try to work the procedures associated with royal 
writs into a system of property law.  
The medieval English experience of trying to fit a non-
property system of landholding into the mold of property 
has the potential to open up further lines of inquiry in 
property theory, lines of inquiry that I will follow in further 
research. After all, if the English, the progenitors of the 
common law, had so much trouble translating their 
landholding practices into the discourse of property, how 
useful is property talk for describing relations between 
people and things in non-Western cultures? Of course, 
words like property and possession mean something 
different to modern legal scholars than they did to Roman 
law-trained justices in the thirteenth century. To American 
lawyers, property does not imply an absolute right good 
against the world. To a lawyer trained in an American law 
school, property implies concepts like subjective rights and 
relative title and brings to mind metaphors like the famous 
bundle of sticks. But this modern conception of property is 
no more neutral than the Roman conception. In comparative 
law literature, we often assume that we can describe the 
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relations between people and things using the terms that 
are familiar to us from first-year property. We assure 
ourselves that, even if the locals would not talk about it 
quite in that way, their relation to the land can be imagined 
in terms of rights to exclude and rights to alienate. We can 
talk about Maori “property rights” before the British 
colonization as if the discourse of property is culturally 
neutral and can be applied across cultures.243 Even when we 
recognize that property talk might be problematic—that it 
might be something of a cheat—it is difficult to escape. 
Richard Overstall has to place it in quotes in his 
Encountering the Spirit of the Land: “Property” in a 
Kinship-Based Legal Order.244 In doing so, he recognizes 
that property might not be the most useful way to 
categorize the ways the First Nations of British Columbia 
spoke about their relationship to the land, but that he is 
unable to completely escape the category of property.245  
 The authors of the Glanvill and Bracton treatises were, in 
a sense, the common law’s first comparativists. They did not 
think of themselves in this way. Rather, they were working 
hard to show that there was nothing to compare; English 
court practice was Roman law. Their failure to demonstrate 
this in a consistent way shows us just how peculiar the 
language of property can be. The ways we talk about the 
relationship between people and things are not neutral and 
we should be careful not to mislead ourselves by applying 
them to situations where they are inappropriate, or we risk 
writing ourselves into the same complicated mess the 
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